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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how the 2010 Olympic Games contributed to the issue of 
homelessness in Vancouver. Specifically, this thesis: 1) investigates how local and provincial 
ordinances were exploited by landlords to displace tenants and used to mobilize spaces for 
Olympic consumption so that unwanted behaviours related to homelessness were criminalized, 
and 2) documents and analyzes the arguments put forward by advocacy groups that contested 
what was happening to low-income and homeless residents because of Olympic development. 
Throughout, I argue that homelessness was exacerbated in the lead-up to the Olympic Games in 
two ways. First, landlords and building owners who wanted to profit from the Games exploited 
loopholes in housing policies. As a result, many tenants experienced adverse treatment and 
displacement in the lead-up to the Games. Secondly, homelessness policies harmed the homeless 
because the policies often involved the forceful removal of the homeless from public view. 
Keywords 
Olympic Games, Vancouver, public policy, homelessness, poverty, displacement, criminalization 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
 
On July 2, 2003, Vancouver was awarded the rights to host the 21st Winter Olympic 
Games in February 2010. Local officials saw the bid as a chance for the city to relive the glory 
and international acclaim it received from hosting Expo’ 86, and took great strides to finance the 
costly Games. A key issue that organizers had to address was how to balance development 
interests with social welfare concerns. In the years leading up to the Games, Vancouver struggled 
to provide adequate shelter and welfare for thousands of individuals facing poverty, 
homelessness, drug addiction, and crime. Of particular concern was Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside (DTES), an area adjacent to several Olympic venues that had a longstanding reputation 
as being one of Canada’s poorest urban neighbourhoods.1 The problems that DTES residents 
faced, and still face today, are complex and interrelated, including “transience and homelessness, 
unemployment (22%), low incomes (75% of the 16,000 residents live below the poverty line), 
high levels of dependence on social assistance, crime, prostitution, HIV infection, drug addiction 
and dealing.”2 
Six years later, on November 25, 2009, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
published a news report titled, “Protesters say law allows ‘kidnapping’ of homeless: Intent is to 
clean up streets for Olympics, say opponents.” The report detailed the passing of new legislation 
in British Columbia, called the Assistance to Shelter Act, which enabled the police “to bundle a 
homeless person into their cruiser and take them to a shelter.”3 Although the Act was intended to 
relieve the homeless during extreme weather, homeless advocates were unconvinced; arguing the 
real intent behind the Act was “to clear street people from Vancouver sidewalks for the 2010 
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Winter Games in February.”4 Other people criticized the Act as unconstitutional, and 
subsequently coined the new legislation, the ‘Olympic Kidnapping Act.’ 
Over the past three decades, scholars have noticed an increase in the overall rate of 
evictions, violence, and criminalization associated with preparations for Olympic Games.5 From 
the Montreal Olympic Games in 1976 to the 2012 Olympic Games in London, UK, low-income 
and other marginalized individuals have experienced the hardships that come with displacement 
and the ensuing challenges of living on Olympic-controlled streets. Though the conditions and 
processes of homelessness that resulted from hosting the Vancouver Olympic Games are not 
well-documented, scholars have argued that the political and economic elites who led the 
development of the 2010 Games did not consider the homeless population as part of their vision 
for a world-class city.6 In the lead up to the Games, DTES residents experienced significant rent 
increases, corrupt rental contracts, as well as the loss and decline of thousands of Single-Resident 
Occupancy (SRO) hotels and subsidized housing due to Olympic-related demolition projects. 
These changes led many low-income individuals and families to become homeless (despite the 
installation of several city-wide initiatives to combat crime, homelessness, and poverty), so that 
more than 3000 homeless people were reported to live in the DTES at the conclusion of the 2010 
Olympics.7 At this point in time, an estimated 15,000 people lived in the DTES. With a history 
of homelessness in Vancouver, it is questionable whether Vancouver’s choice to host the Games 
benefitted the city and its residents, especially those who resided in the DTES.  
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
 
This thesis examines how the 2010 Olympic Games contributed to the issue of 
homelessness in Vancouver. Specifically, this thesis: 1) investigates how local and provincial 
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ordinances, such as the Standards of Maintenance By-law, Residential Tenancy Act, Single Room 
Accommodation By-law, Project Civil City, and Assistance to Shelter Act, were exploited by 
landlords to displace tenants and used to mobilize public spaces for Olympic consumption so that 
unwanted behaviours related to homelessness were criminalized, and 2) documents and analyzes 
the arguments put forward by advocacy groups that contested what was happening to low-
income and homeless residents because of Olympic development. The low-income and 
homelessness community in Vancouver’s DTES is the main focus of this thesis. Throughout, I 
argue that homelessness was exacerbated in the lead-up to the Olympic Games in two ways. 
First, landlords and building owners who wanted to profit from the Games exploited loopholes in 
housing policies, specifically the Standards of Maintenance By-law, Residential Tenancy Act, 
and Single Room Accommodation By-law – by-laws that city officials failed to enforce. As a 
result, many tenants experienced adverse treatment and displacement in the lead-up to the 
Games. Secondly, homelessness policies such as the Project Civil City and the Assistance to 
Shelter Act harmed the homeless because both policies involved the forceful removal of the 
homeless from public view. 
This study builds on the work of a small group of established scholars who have 
documented various aspects of the relationship between hosting Olympic Games and 
homelessness. My work extends their research by focusing on the 2010 Winter Olympic Games 
and by providing a detailed picture of how the Olympic Games contributed to the problem of 
homelessness in Vancouver. This study sheds much needed light on our understanding of 
homelessness in relation to Olympic Games, as well as the social, economic, and political factors 
that place the homeless in situations of vulnerability and marginalization. In doing so, this study 
also contributes to the body of literature that challenges the notion of positive and lasting 
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Olympic legacies for the public. Practically, this thesis can be used to assist scholars, city 
planners, property developers, politicians, and sport administrators in their efforts to address and 
ameliorate similar negative patterns of displacement at future Olympic Games. 
1.2 Methods 
 
 The first stated purpose of this thesis is to identify and explore how local and provincial 
ordinances were used to displace low-income tenants and secure public spaces for the Olympic 
Games.  Public ordinances deemed harmful to the low-income or homeless communities by 
Vancouver’s advocacy community were used in this thesis. Data collection for this thesis 
involved an examination of sources from relevant online repositories, including documents 
released by the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, such as the Residential Tenancy Act 
and Assistance to Shelter Act, which speak to policy decisions concerning the use of public space 
and civil liberty issues. I also consulted various reports and policies released by the City of 
Vancouver such as the Standards of Maintenance By-law, Single Room Accommodation By-law, 
and Project Civil City¸ which contributed to the eviction of DTES citizens and rent hikes prior to 
and during the Olympic Games. Reports, policies, and other related documents from the 
Vancouver Police Department (VPD) concerning increased enforcement and security for the 
Olympic Games were also analyzed. Finally, I consulted documents published by the British 
Columbia Housing Management Commission (BC Housing) which provided supplemental 
information on the housing policies explored in this thesis. In order to examine how the low-
income or homeless population in the DTES were being adversely impacted by public 
ordinances, a thematic analysis was conducted on all the policies, by-laws, and legislations 
consulted in this thesis. Themes and keywords which reflected the ways the low-income or 
homeless population were disadvantaged or limited were analyzed. Special consideration was 
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given to terms and sections that either blatantly disadvantaged the low-income or homeless 
community. Terms and sections that were ill-defined were also taken in consideration as these 
sections offered clues as to how the underprivileged were disadvantaged in the lead-up to the 
Games.  
 The second stated purpose of this thesis is to analyze the arguments put forward by critics 
concerned about how the Games were exacerbating the problems experienced by low-income 
and homeless people in the DTES. For this section, I consulted the documents published by three 
prominent Olympic advocacy groups in the lead-up to, during, and after the Olympic Games. 
The three organizations are the Impact of the Olympics on Community Coalition (IOCC), the 
Carnegie Community Action Project (CCAP), and PIVOT Legal Society (PIVOT). Each 
organization provided online access to useful documents regarding studies conducted on 
homelessness in the DTES, and suggested solutions to combat the problem. Each organization 
also provided transcribed interviews with homeless people and watchdog leaders who addressed 
the problem of homelessness in association with the Olympic Games. Documents deemed 
pivotal by Vancouver’s advocacy community and which were published between 2003 and 2010 
were used in this thesis. Regarding the documents published by the watchdog groups, a thematic 
analysis was conducted to determine how and to what degree each watchdog group differed in 
their approach to advocacy, public policy, homelessness, and the Olympic Games. I was 
particularly interested in examining the priorities and views of each group, and how each group’s 
personal, organizational, and political values affected their approach to policy advocacy for 
housing and homelessness issues in the lead-up to the Games. I consulted these organizations 
because they were the most prominent voices for the promotion of housing rights and 
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preservation of housing stock during the Olympic Games that were documented by print media, 
specifically, The Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun, and The Province. 
A thematic analysis of various newspaper sources was also conducted in order to achieve 
the second stated purpose of the thesis. Media releases from the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC), and articles from The Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, and Vancouver 
Province were used. Regarding the media used in this chapter, the CBC was used for analysis 
because it was a prominent news source for many Canadians, rural and urban, and it frequently 
documented events related to the Olympic Games. The Globe and Mail was selected because it 
was another popular news source for many Canadians, and it was Canada’s largest national 
circulating newspaper. Lastly, the Vancouver Sun and the Vancouver Province were also selected 
because they were Vancouver’s two most read local newspapers. The timeframe for analysis 
spanned from January 2003 to December 2010. This timeframe was chosen because 2003 was 
the year that Vancouver won the Olympic bid and 2010 was the year the Olympic Games were 
hosted. An online keyword search was conducted in all four media platforms. Although 
newspaper sources are secondary sources and can often be coloured by the bias of the author, an 
item was considered to be reliable if a finding resulting from a cross-examination of a single 
theme or keyword from four different newspapers was consistent or similar.   
1.3 Review of Literature 
 
The literature review is divided into three sections. The first section examines the 
literature regarding the consequences of sport mega-event hosting and the material rewards that 
drive investors and politicians to overspend on these projects. The second section focuses on the 
literature concerning the privatization of public space, citizenship, and power, and how these 
7 
 
 
 
processes work together to define and marginalize the homeless. The third section deals with the 
literature documenting how Olympic bids, bid victories, and Olympic development plans 
displace low-income individuals and families from their homes. 
1.3.1 Social Consequences of Hosting Sport Mega-Events 
 
Since its inception more than a century ago, the modern Olympic Games have become a 
mega-event of transnational proportions through means of international investment and urban 
transformation. J.R. Ritchie defines mega-events or hallmark events as, “Major one time or 
recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and 
profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term.”8 Many cities host mega-
events in hopes of reaping various social, political, and economic benefits. Mega-events, such as 
the Olympic Games, are perceived to give cities the image of having a strong economic standing 
in the midst of a rapidly changing globalized world.9 Horne and Manzenreiter note that sport 
mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, are “central to modern capitalist societies” as they 
provide opportunities for economic success and to promote those opportunities to the world.10 
The Olympic Games in particular are thought to provide more and better job opportunities, 
improved transit systems, new housing and sport facilities, increased foreign investments, and 
tourism.11 Furthermore, mega-events or hallmark events may give cities greater opportunity to 
receive federal and foreign resources for venue development.12  
Scholars regard mega-events as “catalysts for destination development and destination 
branding.”13 Following the economic success of the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles, the 
Olympics have come to be seen as “one of the most visible strategies for place marketing.”14 
Tourist urbanization, defined as the “growth of cities built around the consumption of pleasure,” 
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has driven many cities to compete for the right to host the Olympic Games.15 Mega-events also 
give many cities the chance to advance long-overdue plans for urban redevelopment. Cities may 
host mega-events to legitimate long overdue plans to gentrify city areas.16 Additionally, to 
convince local citizens to agree to such large investment, cities often promote mega-events as an 
opportunity to enhance civic identity and improve the community,17 as well as an opportunity 
that could transform the overall quality of life for local citizens.18   
Sport mega-events have been used as an ideological platform to increase the legitimacy 
of the host country.19 Selection by a major international organization such as the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) may signal support for the political and legal institutions of a 
particular country.20 Hyun Bang Shin explains that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was an 
example of this phenomenon. Two years prior to Seoul’s bid victory, Korea’s government had 
secured power through a military coup d’état. The IOC’s decision to select Seoul signalled to the 
world the IOC’s approval of the dictatorial country.21 Gary Cox notes that city officials and sport 
authorities promote the local benefits of hosting a major sporting event and also utilize the 
ideological component of sport mega-events to rally support from local citizens. Citizens are told 
they will enjoy new infrastructure, job opportunities, and a higher standard of living in their 
upgraded city.22  
The accumulation of the economic, political, and social benefits associated with sport 
mega-event hosting are referred to as a legacy. John Gold and Margaret Gold define ‘legacy’ as a 
“comprehensive integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems.” 
City officials planning to implement legacy goals “seek to bring lasting change in the economic, 
social, physical and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change.”23 In the 
context of the Olympic Games, Helen Lenskyj views legacy as “infrastructure, housing, and 
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sporting facilities that are represented as some kind of windfall profit for the host city” and 
provide social benefits that remain long after the conclusion of the Games.24 Legacy has become 
an important and decisive part of the Olympic bid process. In order to remain competitive in the 
race to host, prospective cities allocate a significant amount of money on Olympic development. 
In addition to financing the Games, bid cities must also demonstrate the capacity to leave behind 
a positive, long-term legacy.25  
However, the promises of a positive legacy might also be used to justify the use of public 
funds for costly Olympic development projects. Gold and Gold note,  
At a time when the Games have grown to bloated proportions, imposing financial 
and organizational burdens completely out of proportion, concern for legacy has 
become an inevitable touchstone of the bidding process and a mantra for those 
who seek to justify the necessary virement of funds to see the project to 
conclusion.26  
Lenskyj notes that the legacy left behind a mega-event usually translates into a space that will be 
manipulated and enjoyed by the private elite. The public bears the burden of paying for projects 
that fulfill the aspirations of city planners, the business class, and politicians, rather than the 
majority of residents, especially the marginalized populations. 27 Therefore, Lenskyj describes 
the Olympic Games as an “Olympic Industry.”  Instead of an event used to promote the well-
being of people engaged in sport, the Olympic Games are events organized by the private elite 
for their personal gain, but are funded largely by public dollars.28 
Scholars describe the Olympic Games as ‘planning disasters’29 that are inevitably debt-
financed, leading to heavy cost-overruns and financial crises.30 Under tight deadlines, cities 
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spend billions in order to hasten the completion of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
Additionally, to ensure projects are completed without disruption, cities may use public funds 
without consultation to accelerate project development and reassure creditors of financial 
protection.31 Jay Scherer notes that Vancouver passed Bill 47: The Vancouver Charter 
Amendment Act for the completion of the Olympic Village in 2009. This bill allowed Vancouver 
to fund large development projects without public input.  
Additionally, debts incurred from mega-events often sustain and exacerbate the social 
conditions of disadvantaged host city citizens. Residents near construction sites may experience 
displacement, eviction, higher traffic and pollution, tax increases, increased real estate prices, 
and few social benefits.32 Mega-project costs are often inaccurately reported, as cities invest 
money in projects not related directly to the Games and want to keep those costs out of the 
Olympic budget. For the 2010 Games, the City of Vancouver upgraded the sea-to sky highway 
connecting Vancouver to Whistler, built a transit system that connects the downtown to 
Vancouver’s international airport, and constructed the new Vancouver Convention Centre, which 
totalled an estimated $4 billion.33 The public usually has little say on the subject, despite earlier 
promises of accountability from city government and planners.34 Unfortunately, it has only been 
recently that cities have started to think critically about entering the competitive race to the costs 
involved with the bid process.  
1.3.2 Homelessness, Citizenship, and Privatized Space 
 
City officials and business elites often filter out ‘unwanted’ individuals by means of 
‘human street sweeps’ and legislation that criminalizes poverty so as to fit their image of a 
world-class city. These processes often strip marginalized people of their right to access public 
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space. Some scholars have suggested that homelessness, as a social stratum and as a lifestyle, 
will soon become impossible in host cities if privatization continues in this way.35 
As victims of social exclusion, the homeless are often the most invisible and discounted 
group in society.36 Homeless people, as well as the mentally ill, vagrants, alcoholics, drug 
addicts, the unemployed, and prostitutes are often viewed as “individuals whose misfortunes are 
of their own making” and as useless “social junk.”37 As people who are thought to drain 
society’s resources, the homeless are often perceived as dangerous individuals who pose a threat 
to the social and moral order of society.38 However, Randall Amster argues, the “threat of 
homeless people is generally one of perception than reality,”39 since they hold almost no societal 
power and are not a viable political, economic, or military group. Still, ideas about homelessness 
remain because the ideology of homelessness is so strongly rooted in deviancy, abnormality, and 
negativity.40 Ultimately these negative perceptions are what drive “public demands for 
exclusion-oriented legal practices aimed at erasing [the] visible presence [the homeless] from 
public space.”41 Therefore, homelessness is not merely an economic issue, but an ideological one 
as well.  
Homelessness is difficult to define because it is a “product of the convergence of factors 
operating at the local, national, and global scales.”42 Although the homeless are commonly 
understood as individuals without a home, the definition of ‘home’ fluctuates because different 
individuals experience and define ‘home’ and ‘housing’ in different ways. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the normative experiences of homeless people include “severe and multifaceted 
experiences of marginality and exclusion from mainstream society.”43 Oxford Dictionaries 
defines ‘home’ as “the place where one lives permanently, especially as a member of a family or 
household.”44 The term ‘home’ implies a personal connection to the residence or to other 
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occupants dwelling in the space. The Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and the 
United Nations notes that an adequate standard of living and adequate housing is a basic human 
right.45  
Homelessness refers to the conditions of those without a consistent residence of personal 
attachment, and individuals within those conditions who hold no power to control, alleviate, or 
avoid homelessness. They are individuals who experience social, economic, political, and 
physical barriers that disallow them to maintain or acquire permanent residence.46 According to 
the Canadian Homelessness Research Network (CHRN), 
Homelessness describes the situation of an individual or family without stable, 
permanent, appropriate housing, or the immediate prospect, means and ability of 
acquiring it. It is the result of systemic or societal barriers, a lack of affordable and 
appropriate housing, the individual/household’s financial, mental, cognitive, 
behavioural or physical challenges, and/or racism and discrimination.47 
For the purpose of this thesis, the homeless include individuals without a home and individuals 
who were forcefully displaced from their homes into homelessness and/or temporary 
residences.48  
Both human rights and homelessness share ties with citizenship. Laura Huey states, “the 
ability to access rights and [be] recognized by the state and polity is the mark of true 
citizenship.”49 A homeless individual is a person who exists and is governed by the rules of 
society, but has no relation to it and cannot access the privileges shared by people living in the 
same space. 50 According to Patricia Kennett, homelessness is also an outcome of social 
exclusivity.51 Social exclusion is defined as “processes which separates people from ordinary 
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social exchange that promote integration and participation from rights and services which imply 
full membership of society.”52 For example, in democratic countries, the homeless often cannot 
vote because they do not have a fixed home address. Their inability to vote means they do not 
have the opportunity to offer input into how their city and state should be governed.  
Homeless individuals are also regarded as non-citizens because they are unable to 
contribute to the local economies of their cities.53 Kennett notes, “Discourses of citizenship are 
shaped not only by the material and political realities which they (selectively) reflect, but also by 
the way they seek to provide justification for the principles and social activities which organize 
reality.”54 As such, the renegotiation of citizenship through capitalism has produced increased 
degrees of inequality, social exclusion, and homelessness.55 In today’s North American society, 
citizenship requires economic mobility and social membership, neither of which the homeless 
possess. As a result, the homeless are disadvantaged and further to that, are often discounted in 
major economic restructuring projects, such as mega-event hosting.  
The privatization of public space is one of the main reasons why the homeless experience 
social exclusion. Sociologists often describe space as a complex social construct comprised of a 
material and ideological nature.56 Sonia Hirt defines the material component of space as a 
physical place.57 Randall Amster defines the ideological component of space as a “reflection of 
social processes and a primary factor in the production of such reflections.”58  This happens 
when private elites purchase land and control the images and types of people who should occupy 
it. The physical and ideological elements of space vary according to their historical and cultural 
context. ‘Public space’ and ‘private space’ are concepts that are often ambiguous, especially 
when publicly accessible spaces, such as malls and tolled roads, are privately owned. Therefore, 
as a product of past and present “social negotiation and contestation,” definitions of public space 
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are not universal or enduring. 59 Although public spaces are areas that all people are entitled to 
legally access, they are often places of exclusion.60 Amster notes “visions of public space are 
largely concerned with the ideals and principles embedded in its formation” and it is often the 
basis of “regulatory efforts to purify public space, reinforce patterns of power and privilege, 
encourage aggression, and enforce new forms of spatial exclusion.”61 In theory, Hirt notes that 
public space boasts open-accessibility, but in practice, there are many barriers to accessing 
public space. For the purposes of this thesis, public space will be defined as a common space 
intended to be freely accessible to everyone.62  
Hirt defines private space as “spaces used by small groups of people, spaces that are 
physically enclosed, or spaces to which access is limited via various material or non-material 
impediments.”63 Amster defines the privatization of space as a mechanism which brings public 
space into private ownership and “enables large-scale property owners to exclude ‘undesirables’ 
from places of investment and privilege intended to attract up-scale sub-urbans.”64 As noted 
earlier, many homeless individuals find themselves in a socially disadvantaged position due to 
various societal barriers. As such, privately-owned public space often disfavours the interests and 
needs of homeless individuals. In regards to mega-projects, private developers who purchase 
public space usually do not involve the homeless in their implementation and vision.  
Mega-events are usually held in public spaces that are privately owned. In today’s 
increasingly competitive global economy, large-scale evictions and displacements have become 
a trademark of mega-event hosting. 65 The image of ‘undesirables’ inhabiting Olympic space puts 
city officials under tremendous pressures to move the homeless prior to the start of the Games to 
uphold their preferred world-class city image.66 Therefore, removing the visibility of poverty 
from affluent and gentrified areas of the city has become essential to event-oriented renewal 
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schemes. Many city planners and politicians argue that displacement is an inevitable and natural 
part of large-scale redevelopment.67  Displacement occurs when “the spaces and places in which 
citizens actively create their daily existence together are invisible to bureaucratic abstractions of 
‘delivering’ major venues and new infrastructure.”68  
In creating new spaces, gentrification and re-development create opportunities for city 
planners to redefine the type of people they want to occupy a certain space.69 The privatization of 
public space has become increasingly prevalent within the past three decades, and this exchange 
has contributed to greater degrees of economic and social inequality.70 In order to attract foreign 
investors and visitors, property developers privatize space and intentionally exclude or ward off 
undesirable people, for instance, by making public places uncomfortable for the homeless to live 
in.71 Today, major commercial landmarks and mega-events are ‘fortresses’ which create “new 
and more extreme forms of spatial and social segregation.”72 As privatized space, property 
owners are entitled to make all political and economic decisions, making the city “exempt from 
legal ramifications of shunning away specific segments of the population.”73 Shopping malls, 
private clubs, large conferences, and major sporting events are examples of the ‘fortress’ 
phenomenon which has kept strangers and unwanted individuals out of certain spaces.74 Private 
property, gated areas, paid parking lots, removal of public benches, modified garbage disposal 
units, and private security forces are just some examples of how the fortress phenomenon 
prevents homeless individuals from inhabiting a space.  
In preparation for sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games, cities have 
implemented various ‘tactics of control,’ such as human street sweeps and increased street arrests 
to produce a visually pleasing city. With the rationale of creating a space “devoid of 
embarrassing social problems,”75 street sweeps have become the standard procedure for many 
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Olympic host cities since the 1980s.76 Street sweeps are procedures usually conducted before the 
start of mega-events in which police are given authority to lock up vagrant or deviant street 
dwellers for a period of time. Street sweeps and street arrests are often invasive procedures 
which involve the harassment and arrest of marginal individuals, such as the homeless and sex 
trade workers.77   
It follows then, that cities looking to host mega-events also experience an increase in 
policing and surveillance of homeless individuals and street activity. The criminalization of 
poverty occurs when local ordinances are put in place to punish street activity that may tarnish 
the city’s image.78 It is also a product of a social struggle to define what and who should occupy 
and represent a space. Police may choose to prohibit undesirable individuals from dwelling in 
certain parts of the city by implementing a ‘red zone’, which “is an area that the police have 
designated as ‘out of bounds’ to particular [individuals] who have been banished for partaking in 
illegitimate (though not always criminal) behaviour.”79 Homeless citizens are often subject to 
arrests or charges if police deem their activity disruptive to the public, even if the activity was 
not criminal in nature. These activities include, but are not limited to, panhandling, loitering, 
public camping, squeegeeing, and picking from the trash, which are all important survival 
strategies for the homeless. Overall, procedures to clean the streets, combined with legislation, 
reinforce the idea that homeless individuals are not legitimate citizens; rather, they are a nuisance 
and need to be monitored and controlled.  
1.3.3 Homelessness and the Olympic Games 
 
 One of the first documented cases of homelessness was found in the 1976 Olympic 
Games in Montreal. On  July 3rd,  1976, The Montreal Gazette published an article titled 
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“‘Olympic Victims Hotel’ shelters city’s homeless,” in which several low-income and welfare-
dependent Montreal families and  individuals found themselves living in deplorable conditions, 
aggravated by “government extravagance and indifference to the city’s housing conditions.”80 
This was the first of many articles documenting the stay of families and individuals evicted from 
their homes due to steep rent hikes and Olympic-related demolition projects.81 Following the 
start of the two-month occupation, squatters taped signs over the front door of St. Jean Baptiste 
Meilleur Primary School and Gabriel Souart Secondary School, labelling their temporary 
residence as the “Olympic Victims Hotel.”82 On another sign was written, “We want to be 
lodgers with social dignity.”83 Both schools were offered by the Montreal Catholic School 
Commission as temporary residences. Expenses invested into the move subsequently emptied the 
funds of many families to purchase food and rent. 
 In an attempt to mend the situation, Montreal welfare offices offered many of the 
squatters immediate housing. However, the immediate housing offered to the squatters consisted 
of apartments with broken windows, rotting floors, cockroach and rat infestations.84 The living 
conditions of the squatters at the schools were poor as well. The victims lived off a communal 
food pot fed by city donations and the Aid to Fire organization. Most of the food available 
throughout their two month stay at the school was canned goods and donated staples. Fights were 
caused over a lack in food supply and the squatters often went hungry. 85  
On the day before opening of the Games, twenty-five squatters parked giant food trucks 
outside the main gate of the East End Olympic Village in hopes of collecting leftover food 
thrown out by kitchen staff.86 Robert Gagnon, Director of Food Services at the Olympic Village 
refused the squatters, claiming only rotten food was available. Contrary to Gagnon’s claim, 
Olympic food staff reported that at least 30% of leftover food was thrown out per day, and extra 
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food would not be given to staff members themselves.87 The school squatters left the Olympic 
Village empty-handed.  
August 26, 1976 marked the end of the squatters’ two month school occupation.88 The 
squatters stayed at the schools for nearly a month after the conclusion of the Games. Fifty-seven 
squatters moved out of St. Jean Meilleur School and headed to St. Bibiane, a vacant and 
unlocked school near the Olympic Park. Police arrived the moment the school was opened and 
another eviction order was issued. The squatters ultimately surrendered to the eviction call: 
“Both women and men cried as they watched their furniture being brought down from the “only 
home” they had.”89 
 Although the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games has been praised as one of the most 
successful Games in modern history, Lenskyj notes that many homeless people were arrested for 
jaywalking and other street-related crimes during or near the time of the Games.90 The homeless 
were also detained without charge for up to twenty-two hours and the police were authorized to 
administer street sweeps. Helen Lenskyj’s Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and 
Activism is one of the first scholarly books that provides an in-depth look at human rights 
violations, particularly through forceful evictions, in the Olympic Games.  
 The Olympic-related evictions of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games are regarded as one of 
the most brutal events in mega-event history. In the 1980s, Korea saw a drastic progression from 
self-built housing to high-rise apartments and business buildings. The change towards the 
industrialized production of housing subsequently shifted the social and political structure in 
Korea and fostered desires to host the Olympic Games in order to boost local businesses, 
increase foreign investment, and promote South Korea as a superpower in international politics.91 
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After successfully winning the bid, the Korean bid corporation promptly planned for the 
construction of high-rise buildings. Preparations for the 1988 Seoul Olympics were “one of the 
world’s most physically violent and brutal housing relocation policies” because of the way 
Korean citizens were displaced from their homes after being sold to private developers for 
Olympic projects.92  
In December 1982, the Korean government passed Public Law #3646, which “relaxed 
limits on building height and size in the central business districts.”93 Lisa Kim Davis noted that 
the law was the key that legitimized and encouraged massive redevelopment in association with 
the Olympic Games. However, the law was simultaneously the cause for small business owners 
and community dwellers to lose out to conglomerates purchasing the space for commercial use.94 
Much of the rationale behind Public Law #3646 was for the sake of “city beautification,”95  
which was a government-organized campaign to remove and demolish large tracts of 
inexpensive buildings constructed without permits in residential areas and replace them with 
condominiums without consent. Not surprisingly, the regulation came under scrutiny by the 
public and even major political parties. Davis noted that mayors were continuously replaced until 
one was found who would pursue and support the plans for Olympic development.96  
Between 1983 and 1988, 48,000 buildings housing 720,000 residents were destroyed to 
clear way for Olympic developments.97 Low-income housing was bought out by wealthier 
citizens and property values were raised a substantial amount.98 The most famous case of 
displacement in association with the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games occurred in the Sanggyedong 
district. The eviction case became so notorious that a documentary was made to expose the 
crimes committed towards the residents of Sanggyedong.99 Prior to the Games, 380 residents had 
their belongings removed by a force of more than 3,000 workers because their homes were in 
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sight of the Olympic torch route.100 Security forces were hired by government officials to knock 
down citizens’ homes and the community spent the torch-run period living in holes, caves, or 
plastic shelters out of sight of the road.101 Tents used as community centers were burned down 
by privately hired security forces, and water and electricity supply was cut off. Protesters of all 
ages were also attacked by a police force hired by private construction companies.102 Lisa Kim 
Davis’ article, International Events and Mass Evictions: A Longer View provides valuable 
insight on the effects of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and the Korean housing market.103 In 
addition, Helen Lenskyj’s book, Inside the Olympic Industry provides a similar narrative to that 
of Davis’.104  
 Displacement related to the 1988 Calgary Olympic Games took form in abuse of student 
and tenant rights. The Landlord and Tenant Act in Calgary did little to prevent unwarranted 
evictions and rent increases throughout the Games.105 Occupants of university student 
residences, low-income residential hotels, and rooming houses had little to no protection from 
Olympic-related eviction and rent increases.106 Prior to the Games, over 2,000 students and low-
income renters were temporarily or permanently evicted to provide accommodation for Olympic 
tourists. Although some financial incentives were offered to tenants willing to surrender their 
residences for the duration of the Games, 1,000 university students were omitted from the 
bursary.107  
 The 1992 Barcelona Games witnessed numerous street sweeps targeting prostitutes the 
homeless.108 Nearly 400 homeless people were policed by legislation criminalizing street 
activity. The promise to provide subsidized housing in the post-Olympic village was unmet, and 
most of the 6,000 units were sold for 240,000 pounds. The subsidized housing was so expensive 
that one resident claimed it would have taken her three lifetimes to afford a new unit.109 
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Additionally, the presence of the Olympic Games may have exacerbated the housing market in 
Barcelona. Between 1986 and 2002, new house prices in Barcelona had increased by 250% and 
the city also experienced a drastic increase in the number of renters.110  
 Throughout the 1996 Olympic Games, the marginalized populations of Atlanta also faced 
eviction and abuse.111 Prior to the Games, housing issues in Atlanta were of critical concern for 
homeless advocates and bid organizers.112 At the time of the bid, Lenskyj notes that 30% of the 
population lived below the poverty line and the number of homeless ranged in the 20,000s. Like 
other Olympic cities, the Olympic Games were seen first and foremost as an urban development 
project.113  
Fifteen thousand residents were evicted from two of Atlanta’s oldest social-housing 
apartments and an additional 5,000 housing units were demolished for the creation of new 
residences slated first as Olympic accommodation.114 Between 1990 and 1995, 9,500 units of 
affordable housing were demolished and $350 million (USD) in public spending was “diverted 
from low income housing, social services, homeless support.”115 Churches and human service 
organizations were paid to temporarily house Olympic tourists. Lenskyj notes that rental rates 
increased 20 to 25% the year before the Games started. Landlords also illegally abused tenants’ 
rights by issuing evictions with only seven days’ notice.116  
In 1994, Atlanta gave police the authority to criminalize and issue arrests for street 
activities such as panhandling, loitering, public camping, loitering in abandoned buildings, 
squeegeeing, and picking items out of trashcans.117 This meant the criminalization of a variety of 
activities which enabled the homeless to survive. 9,000 Black men who made up 90% of 
Atlanta’s homeless population were reportedly arrested for violating street ordinances.118 
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Lenskyj argues that the Olympic Games not only exacerbate social problems, but to deepen 
racial and class divides as well.119  
Between 1995 and 1996, under Project Homeward Bound, the city transported hundreds 
of ‘undesired’ people out of the city and threatened to sentence them six months in jail if they 
returned. Assisting the project were non-profit organizations that worked under city auspices to 
bus the homeless out of town. These organizations were paid between $500,000 and $750,000 
(USD) if the citizens they transported did not return.120  
 In preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games, Sydney residents also experienced Olympic-
related evictions. In March 2000, fifty individuals who were made homeless because of rent 
increases began occupying three empty buildings owned by City Council. The squatters “cleaned 
the rooms, repaired the floor and roof, fixed the shower and toilets, secured doors and windows” 
and installed various appliances in order to make the abandoned buildings habitable.121 Three 
weeks prior to the start of the Olympics, the squatters were given notice to vacate the premises. 
Squatters were warned that failure to comply with the notice would result in a police raid.122  
With the help of the local community, the squatters were given permission to stay in one 
of the buildings until the designated move out date on September 25th.123 An email was sent to 
notify the squatters that council officials would arrive at 8 AM to board up the squatters.124 
However, just after midnight on the 25th, eight police officers arrived on premises, tried to kick 
down the doors, and “aggressively pushed, searched and harassed sleepy squatters.”125 City 
employees who arrived the next day to move the squatters received protests and deemed the 
situation too complicated to carry on. The issue remained unresolved long after the Games. 
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Students attending the University of Sydney also experienced housing problems 
throughout the Games. A significant proportion of the university’s buildings, sport facilities, and 
student residences were contracted for use by the Sydney Organising Committee.126 Students 
were evicted from their rooms for four weeks and were given only 24 hours’ notice to vacate. 
Following the Games, demands were made for students to pay reconnection and set-up fees for 
Internet and phone services. International students were put in even more vulnerable positions as 
many students were unfamiliar with Sydney’s rental market and unknowingly paid rental rates 
higher than usual.127 This shows how different segments of the population can be affected by the 
Olympic Games. 
 Even before the hosting of the Games in 2004, “Roma, urban squatters, asylum seekers, 
prostitutes, homeless people” had long been subjected to dismissal and enforcement of the Greek 
government.128 In preparation for Olympic development, 2,700 Roma were evicted for the 
purpose of reclaiming land and resources for Olympic construction. Additionally, squatters in 
temporary stay at a university student residence were ordered to vacate the premises for the 
accommodation of journalists attending the Games. 129 
 In the eight years leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games, 1.5 million Beijing citizens 
were evicted and displaced from their homes because of Olympic-related construction 
projects.130 The Center on Housing Rights and Evictions noted that the Beijing government and 
the Beijing Organizing Committee were the main culprits for evicting low-income tenants 
because the Beijing government failed to provide adequate notice for eviction and compensation 
to assist citizens in securing new accommodation and services.131  
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 Between 2006 and 2008, an average of 60,000 homes was demolished per year, resulting 
in the displacement of approximately 156,000 citizens per year.132 In the year of the Olympic 
Games, 250,000 citizens were displaced from their homes. In Xianyukou, a small region of 
Beijing, 20% of the 2,750 households were forced to move from their homes.133 During 
mediation talks, residents were harassed and threatened by the demolition company negotiating 
the compensation, and many families accepted lower compensation as a result.134 When the 
evictions were carried out, the demolition company took the evictee’s furniture, stored it in 
temporary worker housing, and charged rent to the household until they came to retrieve their 
possessions.135 In the end, many residents were far removed from reliable sources of 
employment, community networks, schooling, and health care facilities.136  
1.3.4 The 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games: Context and 
Review 
 
In 1998, the Vancouver-Whistler 2010 Bid Corporation for the 2010 Olympic Games was 
formed.137 In 1999, the City of Vancouver passed the Southeast False Creek Policy to plan for 
the Olympic Village in the False Creek area.138 The primary goal of the policy was to foster a 
sustainable residential community after the conclusion of the Games. The policy was passed at 
around the same time the Vancouver-Whistler 2010 Bid Corporation began to campaign for the 
possibility of a Vancouver Olympics.139 Although city officials wanted to host the Games, 
concerns about social housing and downtown rejuvenation were raised among the public and 
advocacy groups.140 In March 2000, housing concerns were temporarily alleviated when 
government partners implemented the Vancouver Agreement.141 The Vancouver Agreement was 
an initiative signed between the federal Government of Canada, the Government of British 
Columbia, and the City of Vancouver to implement strategies to address issues of poverty, drug 
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addiction, public safety, and health in the DTES.142 The official website of the Vancouver 
Agreement listed these strategies as possible ways to assist “economic revitalization, safety and 
security, housing, health and quality of life.”143  The Agreement received the Institute for Public 
Administration of Canada’s highest award. 
Although the Vancouver Agreement was meant to create a positive legacy, scholars have 
noted that the primary motive behind the Agreement was to justify bid desires by linking re-
development and re-imaging efforts to social priorities.144 Nathan Edelson’s article, “Inclusivity 
as an Olympic Event at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games,” explains how the organizers of the 
2010 Vancouver Games implemented many initiatives to improve issues of social inclusivity, 
particularly the problem of homelessness in Vancouver. The author’s main argument is that the 
Olympic Games had become a major catalyst to addressing pressing social issues in Vancouver, 
yet the city should have dealt with these issues much earlier. Additionally, Edelson argues that 
budgets spent towards Olympic projects could have been put towards funding the impoverished, 
illustrating that the priority of social inclusivity issues remained low in comparison to Olympic 
development. 
 Furthermore, the Vancouver Agreement and the Southeast False Creek Policy were both 
created during the most crucial moments of Olympic-related decision-making. As attitudes 
towards submitting an Olympic bid became more serious, the Agreement and the Southeast False 
Creek Policy were created to show the public that initiatives were being put in place by the City 
to ensure the well-being of Vancouver citizens if Vancouver won the bid. In 2002, the 
Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation and the City Council signed a financial agreement that 
committed both groups to funding the Olympic Village at the Southeast False Creek location. 
This is important because the City was willing to commit itself financially to hosting the 
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Olympic Games even prior to winning the bid. It was also the first of many commitments that the 
City made with the Olympic organizing committee.  
In that same year, the Vancouver-Whistler Bid Corporation was replaced by the 
Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation. The duration of Vancouver-Whistler Bid Corporation lasted 
from 1998 to 2002. As attitudes towards the bid became more serious, various community 
activists and academics converged to form the Olympic watchdog group, Impact of the Olympics 
on Community Coalition (IOCC) in 2002. The IOCC was “dedicated to maximizing the positive 
impacts of the 2010 Games for the host city and surrounding regions, while minimizing the 
negative impacts.”145 The IOCC also demanded the Olympic bid corporation to consider issues 
regarding environmental sustainability, community involvement in decision-making processes, 
and impact evaluation.146  
Also in 2002, the Government of Canada, the Government of British Columbia, and the 
City of Vancouver convened to create the Inner-City Inclusive Olympics Working Group (IWG). 
The group drafted a list of commitments called the 2010 Inclusive Winter Games Commitment 
Statement (ICI),147 by which the Vancouver 2010 Bid Committee (later to be the Vancouver 
Olympic Committee) promised to abide. The list of commitments included promises to provide 
more business development opportunities, First Nations involvement, employment opportunities, 
community involvement, affordable transportation, and “a legacy of affordable housing.”148 Of 
all the issues raised in the ICI, the City was most concerned about how the Games would affect 
and exacerbate housing losses, evictions, and homelessness. Of particular concern were the 
single-room occupancy (SRO) hotels in the DTES. SROs often house welfare recipients, low-
income individuals, and were regarded as the last resort before homelessness. These units were 
under the greatest threat of demolition and eviction for the Olympic Games. In response, the 
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IWG promised to “ensure people are not made homeless as a result of the Winter Games” and 
“residents are not involuntarily displaced, evicted, or face unreasonable increases in rent.”149 
However, David Eby notes that no Olympic-related social units promised in the ICI were opened 
prior to the Games, and landlords continued to unlawfully evict many SRO occupants due to the 
weak Residential Tenancy Act.150 David Eby’s article, “Closing Ceremonies: How Law, Policy, 
and the Winter Olympics are Displacing an Inconveniently Located Low-Income Community in 
Vancouver,” explains the effects of policing upon the low-income community in the lead up to 
the Olympic Games. As a respected lawyer and DTES citizen, Eby’s research critiques how the 
2010 Games had disadvantaged local citizens through eviction and police harassment.  
In the same year, 2002, the newly elected City Council requested to hold a province-wide 
referendum on the city’s potential bid. Fearing that chances for bid selection would be 
compromised if British Columbians rejected the proposal, the Bid Committee opposed the 
referendum. Nevertheless, the City Council decided to set up a plebiscite for Vancouverites only, 
and though the mayor and city councillors campaigned in support of the bid, the “Yes” side won 
with only 64%.151  In addition, although the IOCC and the IWG demanded transparency and 
accountability regarding budgets and social inclusivity issues, the demands of both groups were 
eventually ignored by the Vancouver 2010 Bid Committee. Both groups were not included in bid 
committee negotiations, nor did VANOC take measures to ensure its commitments were being 
met following the bid victory.152 On July 2, 2013, after Vancouver was chosen to host the 
Games, the City passed a by-law in an attempt to regulate the conversion and demolition of 
SROs. More than 1000 SRO rooms were already unavailable for rent due to voluntary closure by 
landlords or significant rent increases. This meant that even though the City had put measures in 
place so that SROs could not be destroyed and sold without notice, people in need of housing 
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still could not move into the units because of closure or cost-related issues. Although many low-
income citizens were in need of a home, subsidized housing units were rented to Olympic 
construction workers working on major infrastructure projects, illustrating how homelessness 
and housing issues were not addressed as promised. 
In 2006, city officials chose Millennium Developments to create the Olympic Village in 
Southeast False Creek.153  The Vancouver-based company’s $193 million bid beat out offers by 
Concert Properties and Concord Pacific Developments, each of which had strong ties to VANOC 
and Vancouver’s property market.154 In addition to constructing the Olympic Village, 
Millennium Developments was also responsible for the construction of 800 units of market 
housing, 252 units of social housing, a community center, and a childcare facility.155 Despite the 
promise of new market housing units, Millennium’s exorbitant bid raised concerns that even 
middle-class citizens may not be able to afford living in Millennium’s units.156 For VANOC, the 
Olympic Village was a lucrative financial opportunity to facilitate property market sales, expand 
the market value of the area, and recreate Vancouver as a cutting-edge and self-sustaining world-
class city.157 On the same note, motions to install expensive sustainable features into the Olympic 
Village, such as green technology and non-market housing, were not the aspirations of local 
developers. Rather, visions for sustainability were implemented by “civic elites to distinguish 
False Creek as the world’s most sustainable waterfront community.”158  
In stark contrast to Millennium Developments’ $193 million bid to redevelop the 
Southeast False Creek area, SRO buildings were destroyed and rebuilt for tourist 
accommodations at a rate four times higher than the City had expected.159  In 2006, Vancouver 
experienced a loss of at least 4,000 SROs due to conversions, rent increases, and closures, and, 
welfare for shelter assistance provided by the provincial government had not been increased 
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since 2004.160 Therefore, individuals who already struggled to survive in SROs would likely 
become homeless due to increased rental rates and increased property values as a result of the 
Olympic Games.  
In the same year Millennium Developments was chosen to build the Olympic Village, the 
City of Vancouver started Project Civil City. The project’s goal was to significantly reduce street 
crime in preparation for the Olympic Games and to promote Vancouver as a safe and liveable 
world-class city.161 Specific objectives involved reducing homelessness by 50%, eliminating 
Vancouver’s open drug market, decreasing aggressive panhandling, and increasing public 
satisfaction regarding the “City’s approach to public nuisance” by 2010.162 Beyond attempts to 
reducing homelessness and the drug trade, the City also addressed solutions for better health 
treatment programs, better homeless programs, cleaner streets, and better policing efforts.163 
Although the initiatives were for the betterment of Vancouver, the project was ultimately 
dropped in 2008 due to a shift in composition of the new City Council.164 The rise and fall of 
Project Civil City speaks to the low priority given to social change when compared to business 
interests involved in hosting the Games.  
By September 2008, Millennium Developments was $150 million over budget and the 
deadline for completion was still a year away. In response, the New York-based Fortress 
Investment Group, which had already lent Millennium Developments $750 million to complete 
the Olympic Village, decided to drop Millennium’s funding.165 Not only was the Olympic 
Village’s completion in jeopardy, the project itself had become debt financed. At this time, city 
officials felt they had little choice but to fund Millennium Developments to complete the 
Olympic Village. This was the case because in the event Millennium Developments went over 
budget, municipal officials had agreed to provide the hedge fund for the guarantee of completion. 
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The hedge fund agreement was made in confidentiality and eventually brought great mistrust 
from the citizens.  
Jay Scherer’s article, “Olympic Villages and Large-scale Urban Development” critiques 
Vancouver’s mismanagement of finances and public relations for the completion of the Olympic 
Village. There were four implications. First, the City’s decision to finance Millennium’s cost 
over-run meant the entire financial subsidy for the hedge fund would eventually be funded by 
taxpayers’ dollars. Second, due to the confidential nature of the hedge, the City had no choice 
but to fund Millennium’s cost over-runs, as well as any payments demanded by Fortress 
Investment Group. It was revealed that on June 26, 2007, the City had secretly wired Fortress 
Group $190 million for Millennium Development’s $750 million loan without the consent of the 
public.166 Third, had Millennium been financed by a major Canadian bank and not the hedge 
fund, the financial risk for the public sector might have been reduced.167 On October 14, 2008, 
the City advanced Millennium Developments an additional $100 million from the municipally-
operated Property Endowment Fund to help with the cost over-runs.168 Fourth, the confidential 
nature of the loan agreement between the City and Millennium Developments had severed the 
trust between the City and ITS citizens. Vancouver’s private dealings with Millennium 
Developments demonstrated how cities might abuse public dollars for private projects and how 
city officials are not accountable to the public.  
Fearing the Olympic Village would not be completed in time for the Games, the City 
purchased the rest of Millennium’s building loan from Fortress Investment Group in 2009 at the 
cost of $319.5 million. In order to legitimate such a significant purchase, the provincial 
government convened an emergency meeting to pass Bill 49: The Vancouver Charter 
Amendment Act. The amendment states, “The city may, for purposes of financing of, or financing 
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arising in relation to, the development project, on terms and conditions the Council considers 
necessary or advisable, do any of the following.” 169 The city may “take assignment of a loan as 
lender, or assignment of another right or interest in relation to liability” without the need for 
public consultation or accountability.170 This is significant because it shows how Vancouver 
passed legislation to ensure certain projects were financed.  
In addition to Olympic Village costs, Olympic spending also included new sports venues 
($979 million),171 Sea-to-Sky highway improvements ($775 million),172 and $7.8 billion for the 
Athletes Village Canada Line station.173 These costs were not included in VANOC’s overall 
budget because they were not directly related to the Olympic Games, so that the actual estimates 
for expenditure are substantially higher than what was reported.174 Aside from the new sports 
venues, the improvements were used to improve accessibility between the city core and Olympic 
sites and were not included in Olympic costs. Despite assurances from the provincial government 
and VANOC that the Olympic budget would not exceed $600 million dollars, the real cost of the 
Games totalled at least $6 billion.175  
In contrast to the sums the city afforded for the Games, the city failed to invest money 
into housing units and homelessness. After winning the Olympic bid, the DTES lost at least 1400 
units of subsidized housing.176 Between 2002 and 2008, Olympic-related temporary evictions 
and large scale closures of low-income housing resulted in a 373% increase in homelessness in 
Vancouver. Approximately 3,000 people were reported to be living in the downtown area by 
2010, making one in five DTES residents homeless.177 Moreover, the Landlord and Tenant Act 
did not prevent corrupt landlords from inflating rental rates of SROs to exploit the changes 
brought about from hosting the Olympic Games.  
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Vancouver also experienced a drastic increase in policing, charges, and arrests before and 
throughout the Games. In 2008, the Vancouver Police Department issued nearly nine times the 
usual amount of tickets for street crimes, such as jaywalking and illegal street vending.178 
Vancouver invested nearly $1 billion dollars into security for the prevention of terrorism and 
reducing street disorder for the Games.179 The homeless experienced a great deal of harassment 
from police officers. Similarly, there was growing fear among low-income communities that the 
Vancouver Police Department (VPD) would remove the poor from shopping districts and 
middle-income communities.180 According to David Eby, Executive Director of the B.C. Civil 
Liberties Association and a DTES resident, police harassment included ticketing the homeless 
for minor offences such as spitting, jaywalking, biking without a helmet, and street vending.181 
These minor offences were often overlooked several years.182 In 2009, the VPD also released 
their annual Business Plan which promised a greater crackdown on crime, including multiple 
street checks in the DTES, increases in ticketing, and limiting the access of repeat offenders to 
certain parts of the city. 183 
The peak in the crackdown on low-income and homeless DTES residents by the VPD 
occurred during the two-week period of the Olympic Games.184  The VPD created a special 
patrol unit for the DTES called the BEAT Enforcement Team. The team consisted of fourteen 
VPD officers on patrol 24 hours a day for the two-week duration of the Games.185 Although the 
RCMP’s Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010-ISU) was responsible for overseeing 
the overall security plan for the Games, the BEAT Enforcement Team was responsible for 
overseeing security only in the DTES.186 Homeless DTES youth were red-zoned by the VPD 
from certain areas around Olympic venues and events.187  
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Two months following the conclusion of the Games, city officials voted to keep only half 
of the promised amount of social housing, turning the other half into market housing catering to 
Vancouver’s civil servants.188 As predicted, renting, in addition to purchasing property, proved 
difficult for even Vancouver’s middle class citizens. In April 2011, it was reported that 340 
market units had yet to be sold and the city was $700 million in debt. Scherer speculated that 
even if all market units were sold, Vancouver was estimated to lose at least $230 million.189  
Across a backdrop of homelessness in the Olympics and a history of homelessness in 
Vancouver, it is questionable whether Vancouver’s choice to host the Olympic Games was 
beneficial to the city. Although Vancouver had a great vision to implement socially positive 
legacies, the social priorities were only second to elite desires of re-development and world-class 
city ambitions. Therefore, the Vancouver Olympic Games was an exercise of bureaucratic power 
in order to achieve the aims of politicians, businesspeople, and city planners. Similarly, 
marginalized populations, such as the homeless in the DTES, were compromised in the process. 
1.4 Chapter Organization 
 
The second chapter examines how local and provincial ordinances were used to mobilize 
public spaces for Olympic events and venues. The third chapter analyzes the arguments put 
forward by advocacy groups regarding the relationship between Olympic Games and 
homelessness. The fourth and final chapter offers a summary and conclusion, and suggests areas 
for further research on this topic. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Public Policy, Legislation, and the 2010 Olympics  
 
This chapter examines the policies and legislation cited primarily by critics and 
newspaper sources as a catalyst to the exacerbation of homelessness in the lead-up to and hosting 
of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games. In this chapter, I provide a descriptive analysis of how 
specific ordinances cleared the homeless off the streets through coercion and arrest, while other 
ordinances failed to protect tenants against Olympic-related evictions and rent increases. 
Specifically, this chapter examines 1) the Standards of Maintenance By-law, 2) the Residential 
Tenancy Act, 3) the Single Room Accommodation By-Law, 4) the Project Civil City, and 5) the 
Assistance to Shelter Act. Although these ordinances were created at different times and for 
different purposes, their time of enactment along with the preservation of existing ordinances 
played a crucial role in how homelessness was exacerbated before and throughout the Olympic 
Games. 
 A brief summary of each is as follows: The Standards of Maintenance By-law, 
Residential Tenancy Act, and Single Residential Accommodation By-law each regulated the 
creation and occupation of residential buildings in Vancouver and were criticized for allowing 
unwarranted Olympic evictions to occur because of various loopholes in the legislation. The 
loopholes occurred because the regulations lacked specificity and accountability, thereby 
allowing landlords to find other avenues to evict tenants and convert buildings without violating 
the legislation. Project Civil City was a public policy initiative aimed at reducing public disorder 
by increasing police presence and enforcement in preparation for the Olympic Games, and was 
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criticized as a way for police to clear the homeless off the streets through fines and arrests. The 
Assistance to Shelter Act authorized police to coerce homeless individuals into shelters in 
severely cold weather. Similar to Project Civil City, the Assistance to Shelter Act was criticized 
as a way for the police to remove homeless individuals from the street by use of force. Each 
public document is examined separately below. Figure 1 provides a summary of this information. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the policies and legislations that affected homelessness for the 2010 
Vancouver Olympic Games.  
2.1  Standards of Maintenance By-law 
 
The Standards of Maintenance Bylaw (SoM) was first published on July 21, 1981 by the 
City of Vancouver. The purpose of the SoM was to prescribe “standards for maintenance and 
occupancy of building sites within the City of Vancouver to ensure that such buildings and sites 
were free from hazard and were maintained continuously in conformity with accepted health, fire 
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and building requirements.”1 The SoM was initially drafted because the provincial government 
received feedback from tenants “frustrated by the sub-standard and deteriorating housing 
conditions in which they found themselves”2 and was established to ensure that governments 
provided guidelines to “protect [Single Room Occupancy hotels] from premature demolition.”3 
The SoM exacerbated the state of homelessness in Vancouver for two reasons. First, the 
SoM failed to protect tenants from eviction because the regulations were poorly defined and 
lacked specificity regarding a timeline to action. Landlords often allowed SRO buildings (the last 
possible resort for housing) to deteriorate. When found in violation of the City’s codes of 
maintenance, the SoM allowed landlords to evict tenants on the basis of restoration or repair. 
However, following restoration, property owners rented out the units at higher rental rates to 
tourists. Second, although the SoM was created to allow the City to repair or restore property 
without the owner’s permission, the City repeatedly opted to close down buildings instead. 
Together, these two factors contributed to the exacerbation of homelessness in the lead-up to the 
Olympic Games. 
The SoM outlined the conditions of maintenance for residential properties and the 
provisions for which the by-law applied.4 It required all grounds to be clean from rubbish and 
accessible for passage, and enclosures such as fences had to be kept in good condition.5 Walls 
and buildings were not to “become infested with pests.”6 If the SoM was violated, landlords were 
required to fix the units, which included installing or replacing utilities and repairing all 
foundation7 and exterior walls,8 doors, windows,9 and roofing.10 Maintenance also included 
aesthetic changes to buildings, such as painting and restoration.11 A reasonable timeline to action 
was not provided in the document.  
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In the event that an “unsafe condition” was discovered, the SoM stated that “the 
applicable provisions of the Vancouver Building By-law shall apply.”12 The Vancouver Building 
By-law stated, “all unsafe conditions shall require correction to an acceptable level.”13 
Specifically, “any condition that could cause undue hazard or risk to life, limb or health of any 
person authorized, expected or anticipated to be on or about the premises shall be corrected as 
required by the Chief Building Official.”14 Although the Chief Building Official or other City 
employees had the right to conduct repairs and bill the landlord for all maintenance fees, critics 
noted that the City repeatedly chose to close down SROs instead.15 These closures gave 
landlords and property owners the opportunity to evict all tenants and to renovate or convert the 
property for tourist use.  
The SoM also provided the regulations for maintenance in lodging houses. The SoM 
defined “lodging house” as “any building or separate portion thereof with three or more units or 
rooms” which included “a hotel, a motel, apartment building, rooming house, boarding house, 
bed and breakfast accommodation, and a multi-use building containing any combination of 
sleeping units, housekeeping units, or dwelling units.”16 A sleeping unit consisted of “one or 
more rooms equipped to be used for sleeping and sitting purposes.”17 A housekeeping unit was 
“a sleeping unit containing a sink and facilities for cooking.”18 Most SROs were considered to be 
sleeping units, whereas apartment units were usually considered housekeeping units.  
Lodging units had to provide hot water, refrigeration, laundry and washing machines, adequate 
natural light, constant ventilation, garbage disposal, and adequate heating. Importantly, every 
lodging house was required to have “at least one hand basin for every three sleeping units,”19 “at 
least one water closet for every ten sleeping units,”20 and “at least one bathing unit for every 
twelve sleeping units.”21 However, the City often failed to keep SRO owners accountable to 
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these standards. As mentioned in Chapter 1, some SRO hotels had ninety units to one bath and 
sink unit. Furthermore, every lodging house was required to provide clean and sanitary living 
conditions and ensure furnishings were in good repair. According to the SoM, “the City Building 
Inspector may order any lodger occupying accommodation to restore such accommodation to a 
clean and sanitary condition, or vacate such accommodation within the time specified by the City 
Building Inspector.”22 It was unclear as to when the City Building Inspector conducted 
inspections and how long an evacuation would last. As will be discussed in Section 2.3, Single 
Room Accommodation By-Law, there was no standard for accountability between the landlord 
and tenant regarding the secured return of the tenant. Therefore, in the lead-up to the Olympic 
Games, landlords evicted tenants on the basis of renovation with no promise of return.23  
The significance of the SoM lies in how its vaguely defined terms and conditions 
permitted landlords to convert or demolish buildings for tourist use, or to evict tenants with the 
intent of renting the units at a higher price to Olympic tourists. Although the SoM was put in 
place to decrease evictions by allowing the City to conduct repairs on demand, SROs were 
closed by the City at an alarming rate. As mentioned in Chapter 1, over 1,400 subsidized housing 
units were lost between the Olympic bid victory and the Olympic Games. The SoM was a poor 
intervention for the cessation of eviction and exacerbated the problem instead. As such, the SoM 
is a good illustration of how Olympic-related evictions were not caused by Olympic organizing 
committees or the Olympic Games, but by loopholes in, and poor enforcement of, existing public 
policies. In other words, it was the lucrative potential of the Games that led landlords to exploit 
the SoM, combined with the City’s lack of oversight of the policy, that made the SoM an 
ineffective tool for addressing the need to preserve and protect low-income housing in a mega-
event city like Vancouver.  
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2.2 Residential Tenancy Act 
 
The Residential Tenancy Act (RTA) was last updated by the Legislative Assembly of the 
Province of British Columbia in 2002.24 Divided into seven parts, the RTA contained 10 sections 
that outlined the factors and processes of a lawful tenancy agreement. Although the RTA was 
created to ensure equity, critics noted the power imbalances that existed between landlords and 
tenants that gave landlords greater leeway to evict tenants. Termed by critics as “renovictions,” 
last-minute eviction notices were issued to tenants for building renovations.25 Tenants who 
wished to appeal the eviction notices were permitted to bring their case to arbitration meetings. 
However, the appeal process often privileged the landlord instead of the tenant because of the 
time and costs involved, as explained in Section 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.26  
2.2.1 Introduction of Provisions and Administration  
 
 The first part of the RTA outlined the general definition of all terms, the context and 
populations to which the agreement applied, the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, 
and the consequences for breaking the agreement. The RTA extended to tenancy agreements, 
single resident accommodation rental units, and other residential properties.27 Private housing, 
travel accommodation, and not-for-profit accommodation did not fall under the RTA.28  It also 
outlined the duties of the administrative officer or director responsible for overseeing the RTA. 
The director, or the appointed delegate, had the power to establish rules and make decisions 
regarding the RTA and tenancy agreements. To be discussed in Section 2.2.5, the director also 
played an important role in resolving disputes between landlords and tenants.  
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2.2.2 Residential Tenancies  
 
The second part of the RTA addressed the rights and obligations of tenants and landlords 
under tenancy agreements. Legally-binding tenancy agreements were created through a formal 
and standardized process and were required to meet a set of prescribed requirements as laid out 
by the RTA.29 The RTA mentioned other details regarding the procedures that took place at the 
start of a tenancy, as well as specific circumstances under which changes to tenancy agreements 
could be made.30  The landlord was not to terminate a service if “the service or facility is 
essential to the tenant’s use of the rental unit as living accommodation.”31 The landlord was 
obligated to provide and maintain residential space which “complies with the health, safety and 
housing standards required by law, and …makes it suitable for occupation.”32 If the health and 
safety of the tenant was in danger due to the rental unit, “emergency repairs” had to be made.33 
Emergency repairs were required when damages such as major leaks, damaged water or sewer 
pipes, broken heating systems, and damaged electrical systems occurred.34  In other words, 
“emergency repairs” were last-minute restorations that allowed SRO owners to immediately 
vacate tenants from their living units if necessary. The health and housing standards of SROs 
were already poorly enforced by the City, and the lack of accountability between the City and 
SRO owners allowed many SROs to be ill-maintained until emergency repairs had to be 
conducted.  
2.2.3 Rent Increases  
 
The third part of the RTA outlined the maximum allowable rent increase and the timing 
of issuance. For instance, a landlord “must not impose a rent increase for at least 12 months”35 
and “must give a tenant notice of a rent increase at least 3 months before the effective date of the 
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increase.”36 According to the Residential Tenancy Branch, the maximum allowable rent increase 
between the 2004 and 2010 in Vancouver was 4.6%.37 Table 1 details the historical maximum 
allowable rent increase in Vancouver between those years. The Residential Tenancy Branch also 
noted, “Landlords may not retroactively apply a rent increase or catch-up on rent increases if 
they did not issue a rent increase in a previous year.”38 Although the allowable rent increase 
dropped from 2004 to 2010, some landlords raised rents 80% to 100% higher than the original 
rate in the lead-up to the Games.39 These rental hikes contravened the RTA, which clearly 
outlined the legal limit for such units: “A landlord may impose a rent increase only up to the 
amount …calculated in accordance with the regulations.”40 However, the numbers from Table 1 
were nowhere to be found in the RTA or the Residential Tenancy Regulation. Instead, this 
information was published in a separate one-page document by the Residential Tenancy 
Branch.41 To be explored in Chapter 3, critics noted that rent increases were one way that 
landlords took advantage of the RTA to exploit their tenants because rent increases were 
applicable to the tenant and not the unit.42 Therefore, when a tenant left, the landlord could adjust 
the rental rate for the incoming, higher paying tenant. This exacerbated homelessness in the lead-
up to the Olympic Games because rent increases meant there were less affordable housing units 
for low-income citizens. 
Year Maximum Allowable Rent Increase 
2004 4.6% 
2005 3.8% 
2006 4.0% 
2007 4.0% 
    48 
 
 
 
 
2008 3.7% 
2009 3.7% 
2010 3.2% 
Table 1: Maximum allowable rent increases in Vancouver between 2004 and 2010.43 
2.2.4 Ending a Tenancy 
 
The landlord was permitted to submit a notice of termination if a tenant failed to pay rent, 
failed to maintain living premises, or was perceived to be a cause of harm to other tenants. 
Landlords could also submit an application to end a tenancy when “the rental unit is 
uninhabitable.”44 If a landlord had the necessary permit approved by law, the landlord was 
permitted to end a tenancy so as to renovate or sell the building. With a permit, a landlord could 
issue an eviction notice “not earlier than 2 months after the date the tenant receives the notice,” 
and the notice must be issued “the day before the day in the month… that rent is payable.”45 An 
exception to this time frame was when emergency repairs had to be made. Since the nature of 
emergency repairs was urgent, landlords were given the power to immediately vacate tenants to 
commence repairs without the permission of the City. Therefore, critics criticized the RTA for 
allowing landlords to find alternate avenues to evict tenants. Critics condemned this practice of 
“renovictions” because many landlords issued last-minute eviction notices, leaving tenants 
without a place to live.46 After tenants were evicted and renovations were completed, property 
owners increased the rent to cover renovation costs and generate more profit. Even with 
established regulations guiding the process for rent increases, large rent hikes beyond the 
maximum allowable rate still occurred. In one Vancouver apartment that was renovated in 2008, 
residents who wanted to return to their units experienced a rent hike of 80% to 100%.47 The 
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maximum allowable rent increase for that year was 3.7%. The practice of renovictions thus 
highlighted the unequal power struggle between landlord and tenants because it provided 
landlords with an easy opportunity to evict tenants to profit from tourist use.  
2.2.5 Dispute Resolution  
 
The formal procedures for dispute resolution were addressed in the fifth part of the RTA. 
If a landlord and tenant were in a dispute, the director or appointed substitute supervised the 
procedure for resolution. In this instance, the director or substitute had the authority to change or 
determine the rules for rent increases, the amount of compensation for damage, and the 
landlord’s right to enter the rental unit. The process for dispute resolution privileged the landlord 
and sustained the power imbalance between the both parties because landlords had better access 
to the legal system, as well as the financial resources to use that system. When a tenant invoked 
their right to appeal a landlord’s decision, both parties entered into a dispute resolution. 
Following a decision by the director or designate, both parties had the right to appeal for judicial 
review by the British Columbia Supreme Court. Landlords often used the judicial review as an 
intimidation tactic in order to deter a tenant from enforcing their rights.  
Tenants found the judicial review problematic for two reasons. First, the appeal process 
was time-consuming and costly. Many, if not most tenants did not have the money to pay for 
legal representation, and the overall costs for legal fees were usually significantly higher than 
what was awarded to the tenant.48 Second, there were a number of risks associated with the 
judicial review. Usually, tenants did not have the money to pay for losses if the case was ruled in 
the landlord’s favour. Furthermore, there was no mechanism to appeal the outcome of a judicial 
review; the decision was final.49 Although the RTA was designed to protect tenants from 
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evictions, the appeal process placed tenants in a vulnerable position because it required them to 
take a financial risk they already could not afford. Therefore, this process further consolidated 
the power imbalance between the landlord and tenant because it favoured the party with the most 
social, political, and economic resources.  
2.2.6 Significance 
 
The RTA failed to protect tenants from Olympic-related evictions for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, low-income residents experienced unwarranted evictions because landlords 
were permitted to evict tenants for renovations. Following renovations, tenants were expected to 
rent the same units at substantially higher rates. As such, tenants found themselves homeless 
following eviction because they could not afford the new rates. On the other hand, dispute 
resolution often placed tenants in a position of disadvantage because they did not have sufficient 
funds to enter into the judicial review, and landlords used the judicial review as leverage against 
further appeals from tenants. The RTA reinforced the fact that marginalized populations often 
had little financial stability to use the legal process to address their concerns even though the 
system was designed to protect their interests. In this context, tenants who had little money to 
afford new housing or to engage in legal battles found themselves in a position of greater 
vulnerability to experiencing homelessness or financial loss in the lead up to and the throughout 
the Games. 
2.3 Single Room Accommodation By-law 
 
 The Single Room Accommodation By-Law (SRA) came into force on October 21, 2003.50 
The main purpose of the SRA was to regulate the conversion and demolition of single room 
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accommodations51 and to prevent homelessness from increasing in the lead-up to the Olympic 
Games.52 To put the matter another way, the SRA was City Council’s promise to prevent 
Olympic-related evictions from happening.53 At the time Vancouver was awarded the rights to 
host the Games, the conditions of existing SROs in the city were very poor. SROs in the 
downtown core were nearly a century old and had a variety of structural problems which were 
“in violation of City Health, Building, Fire and Standard of Maintenance By-laws.”54 Due to 
these problems, and the escalation of land values in the DTES, many SRO owners could not 
generate a profit from their property and, thus, turned to alternative sources of revenue, such as 
conversion of SROs for tourist use.55 SRO owners were more likely to demolish their properties 
“for higher value residential redevelopment” or convert their buildings for tourist use “as the 
international profile of Vancouver” increased as the 2010 Winter Olympics approached.56  
 The SRA was amended six times: 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2013. This chapter 
will focus on the first five amendments (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009) published from the time 
of the by-law’s inception in 2003 to the Olympic Games. The SRA opened with a definition of 
all the key terms, and highlighted the convoluted nature of this (and other) housing by-laws. For 
instance, “conversion” was defined as a change in occupancy, a change in the nature of the 
tenancy, a change in the frequency of rent payments, a change in which the designated space is 
used for a purpose other than to provide living accommodation, a repair which has no material 
effect on the enjoyment by permanent residents, a reclassification of the building, and a loss of 
exemption from the Hotel Room Tax Act.57 “Demolition” was defined as the “means to pull, 
knock, or tear down or to raze, wholly or partially, a designated room.”58 A “designated room” 
was a single-room accommodation, though not all single-room accommodations were under the 
jurisdiction of the SRA, such as rooms from hotels, motels, and hostels. To help clarify the 
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matter, a list of single-room accommodations was provided in a document attached as Schedule 
A at the end of the by-law.59 Additionally, every owner was required to post a public notice of 
designation for every room appointed as a single-room accommodation. The form of designation 
was appended to the by-law as Schedule B.60 By publishing specific rooms under the jurisdiction 
of the SRA, and by making this information publicly known, the procedures were intended to 
keep SRO owners accountable to the SRA.  
The SRA also outlined the regulations for converting or demolishing buildings and the 
application process for making these changes. An owner was not to convert or demolish a 
designated room unless they obtained a permit from City Council.61 Owners were required to 
outline the reasons for demolition and conversion, and provide tax assessment records, guest 
ledgers, daily rent receipts, and any other details requested by City Council. In addition to 
providing these details, the owner was required to pay a non-refundable application fee of $1000 
for the first ten designated rooms that were to undergo demolition or conversion. A fee of $100 
was applied to each additional designated room listed on the application. The maximum fee for 
all additional designated rooms apart from the initial ten rooms was $6000.62 This means that the 
highest amount that property owners had to pay for the application for conversion was $16,000. 
City Council also considered the history of the land and building, as well as the use and 
occupancy of the building as part of the application process.63 When all factors were considered, 
City Council could enforce certain conditions be fulfilled before a permit was issued.64 If the 
owner was issued a permit and was given permission to proceed to conversion or demolition, 
City Council could prescribe eight additional conditions for the owners to follow. These 
conditions were meant to prevent unwarranted demolition or conversion of SRO buildings. To be 
explored in Chapter 3, even though the SRA was put in place to prevent the conversion of low-
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income housing stock, housing critics found that SROs were decreasing in volume in the lead-up 
to the Games. The eight conditions are examined below. 
First, Council could require the owner to pay $15,000 towards the “city’s reserve fund for 
the replacement of replacement housing” as a condition of receiving the permit.65 Although this 
initiative was put in place to create more housing stock, critics noted that the City failed to spend 
the funds to create subsidized housing.66 Second, the owner could be required to enter into a 
heritage revitalization agreement or obtain a heritage alteration permit as a condition of receiving 
a permit.67 Third, Council could make the owner enter into a covenant with the City to secure the 
owner’s obligation to follow and comply with the conditions attached to the conversion or 
demolition permit.68 Fourth, Council could ask the owner to “execute and deliver to the city any 
instrument required” and “register such instrument” in the Vancouver/New Westminster Land 
Title Office.69 Fifth, Council could permit the owner to rent the designated room to transient 
guests70 on the condition the owner located “comparable or better accommodation at a 
comparable or lesser rent for the permanent resident of the designated room.”71  In other words, 
if the owner wanted to rent the room to someone other than the permanent resident, the owner 
was required to arrange the resident’s relocation, pay for all moving fees, assure Council that the 
owner would rent the room as a permanent residence during the balance of the year, and arrange 
the return of the permanent resident afterwards.72 Owners were not allowed to rent more than 
10% of the rooms in a building at any given time.73 Sixth, Council could allow the owner to 
repair or convert designated rooms if the owner followed a similar list of criteria as listed in 
Section 4.6.e, which is explained in the following paragraph.74 Seventh, the owner was also 
required to allow City employees to inspect the buildings “from time to time and at any 
reasonable time.”75 Finally, if an owner was issued a permit with a time limit, the owner was 
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required to agree to the requirements of “how and when the owner is to restore the applicable 
designated rooms.”76 A conversion or demolition permit was usually valid for twelve months 
from the date of issuance, and the owner was required to carry out the conversion or demolition 
permit in accordance with the conditions listed on the permit and existing by-laws.77 If the owner 
breached the permit or the permit expired, Council could revoke the permit and “the permit 
holder must not do anything further under the authority of the permit.”78 As noted, these rules 
were put in place to prevent owners from dislocating low-income residents in order to demolish 
and convert their buildings for greater profit.  
However, Section 4.6.e and 4.6.f of the SRA are significant because they allowed SRO 
owners to legally evict tenants providing those tenants were adequately compensated for their 
losses and given an opportunity to return to their permanent place of residence once conversion 
was completed. The problem with these sections was that there was no clear mechanism to 
ensure landlords would compensate the tenants or assist with their return. Furthermore, landlords 
were not obligated to tell the City what they were doing with the new conversions. As noted in 
Chapter 1, in the years prior to the start of the Games, many SRO owners evicted their tenants to 
rent to construction workers completing Olympic infrastructure projects and to journalists 
covering the Games. Additionally, many SROs were converted or demolished for the purpose of 
creating new, higher priced accommodations for tourist use. 
The last few sections of the by-law detailed the procedures for enforcing the SRA.79 If a 
building was found to be in violation of the by-law, the Director of Licenses and Inspections 
could request the owner to discontinue the conversion or demolition, or carry out work to bring 
the building in conformity with the by-law.80 Any building violation meant that the owner could 
be charged a fine of $500 to $2000.81 A fine of $50 was issued on a daily basis if the convicted 
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property owner chose to neglect the offence.82 Although the SRA’s regulations and fines were 
meant to deter property owners from applying for demolition or conversion, many SROs were 
closed by the City in the lead up to the Games. SRO owners benefited from these closures and 
were able to increase their profits by converting their property for tourist use. This is a salient 
point: SRO owners took advantage of the SRA to convert their buildings for higher income 
tourist use, while the existing tenants, who ranked among the city’s poorest residents, were 
powerless to challenge their displacement.  
2.4 Project Civil City 
 
 In November 2006, then-Vancouver mayor Sam Sullivan published a thirty-two page 
document that included a proposal to “address the issue of public disorder” in the City.”83 The 
proposal documented a major initiative, Project Civil City (PCC), which Sullivan referred to as 
“a call to action” and involved aggressive tactics targeted at decreasing street disorder and public 
disarray.84 To address these issues, the PCC recommended fifty-four initiatives, most of which 
were already existing, to meet four fundamental goals by 2010. The goals were as listed:  
a) Eliminate homelessness, with at least a 50% reduction by 2010. 
b) Eliminate the open drug market on Vancouver’s streets, with at least a 50% reduction by 
2010. 
c) Eliminate the incidence of aggressive panhandling with at least a 50% reduction by 2010. 
d) Increase the level of public satisfaction with the City’s handling of public nuisance and 
annoyance complaints by 50% by 2010.85  
Discussions from roundtable meetings with community leaders, representatives of the provincial 
and federal government, various administrative officers of the city, and public voices from a 
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web-based survey regarding public disorder helped to formulate the goals and initiatives outlined 
in the PCC. In light of my thesis topic, I will focus on the PCC’s interventions targeted towards 
homelessness and public nuisance. Figure 2 provides a timeline of the PCC.  
There were four main problems with the PCC. First, the PCC staff did not share 
Sullivan’s intentions to use the Olympic Games as leverage to reach the PCC’s goals, with the 
result that all Olympic-related initiatives were deleted in subsequent drafts of the document. This 
became more obvious in May 2007 when former MLA member Geoff Plant was appointed the 
new PCC Commissioner. Much of the project changed under his direction to focus on 
homelessness and less on policing public disorder. Second, the PCC timeline to consult with 
multi-levels of governments and departments was ambitious. Public disorder was a problem that 
had plagued Vancouver for decades, and some politicians were sceptical the PCC would 
accomplish its goals within the stated timeline.86 Third, there was really nothing new about the 
PPC; most of its initiatives were already in place, amalgamated from different projects. As such, 
the PCC was mostly a public relations tool meant to garner public support for the Games. It was 
not a new project idea with new resources for addressing long-standings problem in Vancouver. 
Lastly, poverty advocates and individuals from opposing political parties criticized the PCC from 
the very start, referring to it as a “targeted crackdown on the most vulnerable in our city, in order 
to “clean up” Vancouver for international scrutiny during the Olympics.”87 This is an important 
point because politicians and poverty advocates were already aware of the potential for police to 
clear the homeless from Vancouver streets in the lead-up to the Games, and many saw the PCC 
as a tool to reach these objectives. The combination of these factors led to the PCC being 
withdrawn in 2009.  
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2.4.1 The Public Release of Project Civil City  
 
As noted, the PCC was a public policy project that consisted of fifty-four initiatives to 
address street disorder. When the PCC was released, ten additional criteria were listed for city 
and government partners to follow. The first criterion was a recommendation to allocate at least 
$1 million dollars from the Olympic Legacy Fund, “to enhance the civic response to nuisance 
and annoyance complaints.”88 Three of the criteria dealt with the appointment of a commissioner 
and several planning committees to implement the PCC. Approximately $300,000 of public 
funds went to establish a PCC Implementation Office and hire a PCC Commissioner to lead the 
project. The remaining six criteria suggested revisions to social programs and policies aimed at 
reducing street disorder. One even suggested the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) “adopt 
policies that will increase the street presence of …existing police forces,”89 which is now a well-
known and well-documented practice undertaken by host cities.  
According to Mayor Sullivan, the PCC was “designed to restore the public’s sense of 
personal safety, promote civic pride and encourage personal responsibility through incremental 
change.”90 In doing so, the PCC would help position Vancouver as an optimal city in which to 
live, work, visit, and invest. As mentioned in Chapter 1, civic elites lured by the slim possibility 
of reaping various benefits and greater chances at foreign investment, often bid for the rights to 
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host the Olympic Games. To do so, however, they must sell their city as a world-class city. 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of the Project Civil City 
The PCC would help facilitate Vancouver’s transformation to a city that would attract positive 
world-wide attention and investment, with the Olympic Games being the mechanism through 
which to achieve that goal. In the PCC proposal, Sullivan noted, “we have a tremendous 
opportunity to use the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games as a catalyst to solve the 
public disorder problems that affect our city.”91  It is interesting to note that the Olympic Legacy 
Fund was to be used to achieve the PCC goals. In order to rally support for the PCC and the 
Olympic Games, Sullivan framed the PCC as part of Vancouver’s Olympic legacy to solve 
Vancouver’s long-standing problem with public disorder, stating, “we must use these Games to 
create social and human legacies that will benefit generations to come.”92  
The PCC discussed the root causes of homelessness, the lack of housing, drug addiction, 
and mental illness, in addition to the fifty-four initiatives already in place to combat these issues. 
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The document concluded with a summary of public feedback from a web-based survey regarding 
each issue. Throughout the document, the need to strengthen initiatives aimed at combatting 
homelessness and civil disorder was noted. As well, it stated that solutions for the eradication of 
homelessness would be addressed through “housing policy, income policy, support programs, 
service coordination and housing supply.”93 Major terms such as, “public disorder,” “public 
nuisance,” and “public satisfaction” were undefined in the project. Although the PCC had many 
flaws and was heavily criticized, Sullivan succeeded in convincing the city to invest in the 
overly-ambitious, poorly-defined project because it was an extension of Vancouver’s Olympic 
legacy plans. However, the PCC’s claim to reduce public disorder as part of its legacy did not 
last beyond the first progress report for the project.  
2.4.2 First PCC Progress Report 
 
 On March 27, 2007, the City of Vancouver published the first of three progress reports on 
the PCC.94 Of the ten additional criteria listed for immediate execution in the 2007 publication, 
only six actions were carried out. Of those six actions, only three addressed public disorder 
issues. Expanding on the fifty-four initiatives, the first progress report added eight initiatives that 
further addressed street disorder issues in Vancouver, totalling sixty-two initiatives altogether. 
All sixty-two initiatives were summarized and put into a single document called “Project Civil 
City Action Plan.”95 
The Action Plan categorized the initiatives according to the PCC’s four major goals: 1) 
homelessness, 2) open drug market, 3) aggressive pan-handling, and 4) public nuisance and 
annoyance complaints. The initiatives were further categorized into three time frames: 1) 
immediate, 2) mid-term, and 3) long-term goals. Immediate initiatives were projected to take one 
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year or less to fulfill. Mid-term initiatives were projected to take one to three years to complete. 
Long-term initiatives were projected to take three to five years to complete. None of the 
initiatives were new; all had been in place years before the PCC even existed. By committing to 
sixty-two initiatives, the PCC became even more ambitious. Calculating the time it would take to 
consult with various departments, it became even more obvious to politicians in opposing parties 
that the goals would not be reached by 2010.96  
 Of the sixty-two initiatives listed in the Action Plan, fifteen initiatives were identified as 
immediate goals and had already begun at the time of the report’s publication. Of those fifteen 
initiatives, five addressed plans to reduce homelessness and ten addressed plans to “reduce 
public nuisance, annoyance complaints, and aggressive panhandling.”97 Of the ten initiatives that 
dealt with public nuisance, seven involved cleaning public spaces of waste or undesirable 
images, one addressed public safety concerns, and two dealt with increased police surveillance, 
ticketing, and fines. As mentioned earlier, many politicians and critics believed the PCC was 
little more than a crackdown on homeless activity through ticketing and fines, which was true to 
some degree, since, as will be seen with the Assistance to Shelter Act, the police played an 
integral part in building the world-class city image by clearing the homeless and other 
marginalized individuals off the streets.  
 Furthermore, seventeen of the sixty-two initiatives involved investigating and combating 
homelessness in Vancouver. Despite acknowledging housing policy as a solution to 
homelessness, only two policies (Single Resident Accommodation By-law and Standards of 
Maintenance By-Law) were mentioned once and were not elaborated upon.98 However, 
according to critics, there were multiple policies in addition to the Single Resident 
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Accommodation By-Law and Standards of Maintenance By-Law that exacerbated homelessness 
in Vancouver. This will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
Finally, forty-two of the sixty-two initiatives addressed issues of public nuisance. Of 
those forty-two initiatives, two mentioned the need to change unspecified policies, five outlined 
existing interventions that dealt with different crimes, six dealt with ways to clean the streets of 
litter, five focused on redesigning city spaces, eight dealt with crime, six addressed enforcement 
through ticketing and fines, two involved increasing surveillance, and ten outlined the need for 
greater police presence on the streets. To put the matter another way, seventeen of the sixty-two 
initiatives dealt with increasing police presence, surveillance, and enforcement in preparation for 
the Olympics. Although the PCC was instated to reduce public disorder in Vancouver, scholars 
have noted that previous police initiatives aimed at reducing public nuisance have had a negative 
impact on marginalized populations in the DTES.99  This is because marginalized individuals hid 
from the police for fear of arrest, and their dislocation disrupted their access to social services 
leading them to engage in illegal activities.100 It was a vicious cycle of fear, displacement, and 
disruption for the targets of this policy. 
2.4.3 Second PCC Progress Report 
 
 On October 30, 2007, the second PCC progress report was released. It outlined the 
appointment of the new PCC Commissioner, Geoff Plant.101 Although the four fundamental 
goals of the PCC (homelessness, open drug use, panhandling, and public nuisance) remained 
unchanged, the sixty-two initiatives proposed in the Action Plan were scrapped. Under Plant’s 
leadership, and with the Action Plan gone, the PCC was revised again , this time to address three 
themes: 1) Support to Homeless and Vulnerable People, 2) Citizen Engagement, and 3) 
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Achieving Public Order.102 Plant envisioned each theme as one factor that affected the next in a 
cyclical manner. Each theme was to be achieved by three or four different initiatives. Plant 
refashioned the PCC to focus largely on solving homelessness instead. Public disorder initiatives 
mentioned in the second progress report focused on bringing “responsible officials together to 
develop a set of proposals” and creating an initiative which “sees the rewarding of positive, pro-
social, civil behaviour.”103 Policing, ticketing, and fines were not mentioned in the second 
progress report, and the report did not mention why there was a shift in focus to homelessness. 
What was clear was that Plant’s project was no longer the PCC Sullivan had initially envisioned. 
Plant’s appointment also heightened public criticism of the PCC. Many politicians from 
opposing parties condemned the Action Plan as a poor use of tax dollars because it would not 
reach any of its goals. Then-councillor Raymond Louie noted, “shouldn’t we be actually putting 
the resources necessary to the initiatives that are under way currently, [which] have been 
identified through previous reports and actually enable those programs to have some success?”104   
2.4.4 Third PCC Progress Report 
 
The last progress report, published on June 24, 2008, was substantially shorter than the 
previous two reports and provided a summary of what each initiative should achieve.105 In this 
sense, they were not really “progress reports” so much as they were public policy statements 
about what city officials hoped to achieve through various initiatives, most of which were 
already in place. In short, they were public relations tools to reaffirm Vancouver residents that 
the Games would enhance their city by addressing public disorder and homelessness issues, 
especially in the DTES. The title of the report was entirely misleading.  
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With the second report, the PCC received more criticism and the project began to fall 
apart. Sullivan admitted there were “problems achieving success on key fronts of …the Civil 
City Project.”106 The PCC’s lack of success affected Sullivan’s chances for re-election. During 
succeeding Mayor Gregor Robertson’s campaign, Robertson noted, “There needs to be an overall 
change in the city’s approach to dealing with street disorder” since many tax dollars were being 
invested into the failing PCC.107 Robertson promised to cancel the PCC and spend funds on 
“community policing and ending homelessness” instead.108 With the instalment of Robertson’s 
government, the PCC was abandoned in 2009.109  
2.4.5 Significance 
 
The significance of the PCC rests on two points. First, consistent with the literature 
review, Mayor Sullivan saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to spend nearly $2 million 
dollars on an image building project for the city.110 The PCC is a good illustration of how public 
policy is used by government administrators to create Olympic legacies. In this case, the 
Olympic legacy of the PCC was to reduce public disorder in Vancouver. However, public 
disorder was a key social problem that had plagued Vancouver for decades. As noted by critics, 
it was unlikely the PCC’s goals would be reached by 2010. Therefore, the PCC did a better of 
job of gaining support for the Olympic Games than solving public disorder issues.  
Second, efforts to regulate public nuisance called for a greater police presence, increased 
surveillance, and increased enforcement through ticketing and fines. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
street sweeps and the criminalization of poverty was common practice for many host cities. The 
PCC reinforced the fact that government officials often resorted to policing to create the image 
of a world-class city by clearing the homeless and other marginalized individuals off the street. 
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Nevertheless, public disorder initiatives focused on increased police presence often brought 
greater harm to the homeless by invoking fear and encouraging rash decisions in order to avoid 
arrest.  
2.5 Assistance to Shelter Act 
 
The first reading of the Assistance to Shelter Act (ASA) was introduced by the 
Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia on October 29, 2009.111 The Bill 
passed through two additional readings before coming into force by Royal Assent on November 
26, 2009. The ASA, also commonly referred to as the “Olympic Kidnapping Act,” gave police 
the power to “transport the person at risk to an emergency shelter” by use of force when a 
weather advisory alert was issued.112 Supplementary to the ASA, the Assistance to Shelter 
Regulation (ASR)113 outlined how the ASA should be applied, the formal procedures for issuing 
weather alerts, and when the ASA could be activated. Specifically, the ASA was activated when 
a community representative or the Minister of Housing and Social Development issued an 
extreme weather alert due to severely cold or harsh weather conditions as prescribed by the 
Extreme Weather Response Plan (EWRP).114  As part of the Extreme Weather Response 
Program, the EWRP was an initiative conducted and funded by the British Columbia Housing 
Management Corporation (BC Housing) to “enable communities to temporarily increase 
emergency shelter capacity during extreme weather conditions that threaten the safety and health 
of individuals and families who are homeless.”115 To join this initiative, each community was 
required to file a EWRP outlining the “geographical area, description of weather conditions that 
[formed] the basis for an alert in their community and the designated community 
representative.”116 Each EWRP for every region under the ASA was accountable to the 
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requirements of the Extreme Weather Response Policy. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 EWRPs for Vancouver were consulted. The 2009-2010 and 2010-
2011 EWRPs defined when the ASA was activated in the lead up to and during the Olympic 
Games. 
Upon issuing an extreme weather alert, all police forces in the applicable region were 
notified. A police officer assessed whether a homeless person was at risk of harm or in need of 
assistance. The assessment of risk included considerations about location, age, and risk to 
suffering physical harm. However, the definition of “risk” and the degree to which an event 
could be defined as “physical harm”117 could not be found anywhere in the ASA, implying that 
“risk of physical harm” was up to the discretion of the police officer. In the event that a person 
was deemed at risk, the police officer would request permission from the individual to take them 
into to an emergency shelter. If the individual refused to comply, Section 7 of the ASA allowed 
police to use “reasonable force… [to] transport the person at risk to an emergency shelter.”118  
Since the ASA did not define “reasonable force,” critics saw the legislation as a way for police 
authorities to “clean up” the streets for the Games.119  That being said, the 2009-2010 and 2010-
2011 EWRPs provided a stronger definition of what “risk of physical harm” meant. They noted 
that “an alert will be called when weather conditions are deemed severe enough to present a 
substantial threat to a life or health of homeless persons.”120 The EWRPs of other regions in 
British Columbia shared the exact same definition, yet “risk of physical harm” in the provincial 
ASA remained undefined.121 Despite an extensive list of definitions in the ASA, it was unclear 
why the EWRP, which was not recognized as law by the Legislative Assembly of British 
Columbia, defined “risk of physical harm” whereas the ASA did not. As such, determining 
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physical harm was left to the discretion of each officer, which provided them with a great deal of 
latitude in terms of how to manage this issue.  
The Vancouver 2010-2011 EWRP also gave a clear definition of what “reasonable force” 
in Section 7 of the ASA meant. According to the EWRP, the ASA granted “local police and the 
RCMP the capacity to bring the homeless person to a shelter during extreme weather alerts, 
against their will if necessary.”122 As such, the EWRP acknowledged that police could use force 
to sufficiently coerce an individual into shelter. To be explored in greater depth in Chapter 3, this 
is an important point because the ASA was criticized as legislation that allowed police to clear 
the streets of homeless people in preparation for the Games.  
At the municipal level, the ASA and the Extreme Weather Response Program was 
patented through the Winter Response Shelter Strategy. According to the City of Vancouver, the 
Winter Response Shelter Strategy was created in 2008 when a woman burned to death trying to 
keep warm by candle flame on a severely cold night.123 Housing Minister Rich Coleman quoted 
the same tragic event as the catalyst for the creation of the ASA.124 However, housing critics 
remained suspicious of the timing of the ASA since homeless individuals had faced similar 
deaths for years without notice. According to David Eby, a key voice in the fight against 
homelessness in Vancouver, “The timing is very suspicious – homeless people have been dying 
for years. Police could use this to move people out of residential areas, out of tourist areas.”125  
At the municipal level, Vancouver City Council documents also revealed a concern from various 
politicians regarding “the harmful effects of enforcing the Assistance to Shelter Act in 
Vancouver” and that “efforts be made to encourage homeless people to seek shelter rather than 
use coercion.”126  These comments also revealed the aggressive nature of the ASA on homeless 
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citizens because the law violated the rights of homeless individuals who choose to remain 
outside.  
 On December 9, 2009, the VPD released an administrative report stating, “The creation 
of a formalized process to issue extreme weather alerts requires the creation of policy to manage 
the response by the Vancouver Police Department.”  The VPD-specific policy, called Extreme 
Weather Assistance, was meant to assist the police in transporting the homeless to shelters and 
can be found in the VPD’s Regulations and Procedures Manual. In the administrative report, the 
VPD noted that the ASA allowed police to use “reasonable physical force” to compel a person to 
emergency shelter. Yet, the VPD insisted that officers would offer “further assistance” in the 
form of “minimal non-forceful touching equivalent to the supporting hand one would use in 
helping an elderly person cross the street”127 and “disengage and release the person” if met with 
physical resistance.128 
 There appears to be a gap between the VPD’s Extreme Weather Assistance policy, the 
ASA, the regional EWRP, and the opinion of city councillors. Although the VPD claimed to 
persuade the homeless to shelter by use of “non-forceful touching,” both the EWRP and city 
councillors expressed an understanding that the homeless would be coerced into shelters or 
brought against their will if necessary. The VPD’s policy on the ASA was not recognized by the 
Legislative Assembly of British Columbia as law and was self-governing. Therefore, the ASA 
overruled the VPD’s policy. Additionally, since “extreme weather” was not well-defined in the 
ASA, police had considerable latitude as to when to coerce the homeless into shelter. Nearly two 
months prior to the establishment of the ASA, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
published an article on its homepage regarding four leaked documents from the provincial 
government.129 The four documents (two emails and two memos) included an early draft of the 
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ASA, a list of questions regarding the proposed legislation, and a list of issues associated with 
the ASA. The early draft was very similar to the ASA in force today. However, in the memo 
regarding the “proposed process to assist persons to shelter,” the government had initially 
proposed to “enable the police officer to use force.”130 The word “reasonable” was absent in the 
draft, leaving “force” undefined. It is unclear as to why “reasonable” was included in the official 
draft of the ASA. Yet, regardless of whether “force” was intended to be reasonable or coercive, 
the provincial government had intentions to move the homeless off the streets by use of force. 
Although the use of coercion to prevent deaths in severely cold weather may seem like a 
good policy decision to act upon, coercing the homeless off the street for commercial reasons is a 
dubious practice, never mind the fact that coercion of this sort for any reason is a violation of 
human rights.131  In reality, the ASA was not so much about protecting the health and safety of 
homeless individuals in Vancouver, but a tool which, under the premise of health and safety, 
allowed police to clear the homeless off the streets to promote the image of a prosperous and 
socially conscious world-class city. The proposed draft also initially allowed jail cells as a form 
of “alternate accommodation” if emergency shelters were full. According to the draft, “As a last 
resort, …the individual may be taken to police cells, either voluntarily or involuntarily, where 
they will be held until the extreme weather declaration is no longer in effect.”132 The draft was 
once again discrepant with the VPD’s policy regarding “minimal non-forceful touching” and 
disengaging when met with resistance.133  
There are three points of significance for the ASA. First, similar to other policies, it was 
created to help build Vancouver’s image of a world-class city by allowing authorities to legally 
remove “undesirable” people from Vancouver’s streets for the Olympic Games. Second, 
loopholes in the legislation and the discrepancy between the ASA, the EWRP, and the VPD 
    69 
 
 
 
 
meant police officers had a great deal of latitude as to when and how to bring the homeless to 
shelter because important terms such as “extreme weather,” “risk of physical harm,” and 
“reasonable force” were ill defined. Third, the ASA allowed police to coerce a homeless 
individual into shelter even though it was a violation of human rights. Altogether, the ASA 
shows how politicians, city officials, and the business class often use public policies for their 
personal benefit, and that this is done in spite of repeated public pronouncements about how 
those same policies are created and enforced to protect the very same people who are being 
displaced by those policies. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 There are four key take away points from this chapter. First, the exacerbation of 
homelessness in the lead-up to the Olympic Games was a result of faults in public policy and city 
administration. As mentioned earlier, Olympic-related evictions were not necessarily caused by 
Olympic-organizing committees, but through loopholes in public policy. These loopholes, along 
with the lucrative potential of hosting the Olympic Games, led many landlords and property 
owners to exploit the SoM, RTA, and SRA to profit from the Games. Second, city officials used 
their main tools – public policies – to augment Vancouver’s image as a world-class city for the 
Games. The ASA and PCC are two examples of ordinances that utilized policing strategies to 
prepare for the Olympics. Despite mega-event research that clearly shows how policing tactics 
harm marginalized individuals, public disorder and homeless policies continue to emphasize the 
importance of increased policing in the lead-up to major events. Third, public policy was an 
important tool used by Olympic boosters to reach their Olympic legacy goals. For instance, 
Mayor Sullivan envisioned the PCC to be a project that would leave behind a legacy to be 
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enjoyed by Vancouver citizens for years to come. However, the PCC did not stop homelessness 
from decreasing in the lead-up to the Games because of loopholes that the city failed to address, 
as well as poor public oversight of housing policies. In other words, public officials must be 
pressed into service and held accountable for their claims about social sustainability. The Games 
themselves do not cause homelessness. Rather, the problem is the failure of public officials to 
monitor and control the ways in which public policies are created and implemented, ostensibly 
for the public good. Finally, loopholes in the RTA, ASA, and the PCC reinforced the unequal 
power relations that exist between the key actors in this drama, such as the landlord and tenant, 
as well as the police and the homeless. The landlord’s power was preserved through the 
provisions of the RTA because the by-law favoured the party that had the financial resources to 
appeal a decision and the best access to the legal system. In the case of the ASA and PCC, the 
ASA gave police the power to coerce the homeless into shelter, while the PCC regulated the 
behaviour of street people through increased police surveillance and enforcement. The power 
imbalance between these groups reinforce the fact that marginalized individuals are further 
disadvantaged in mega-event planning, in spite of public pronouncements claiming the opposite 
to be true.  
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Chapter 3 
3 Critics, Public Policy, and the 2010 Olympics 
 
 In the lead-up to the Olympic Games, prominent housing critics and Olympic watchdog 
groups recognized that poorly enforced policy and legislation were the greatest factors that 
exacerbated homelessness in Vancouver. This chapter examines the various publications released 
by the Impact of the Olympics on Community Coalition (IOCC), the Carnegie Community 
Action Plan (CCAP), and the PIVOT Legal Society (PIVOT). The IOCC, CCAP, and PIVOT 
were the three most critical organizations to address the issue of homelessness in Vancouver in 
conjunction to the Olympic Games. Although these groups were formed at different times and 
advocated different issues, all three groups were concerned about how public policy, linked to 
the Games, aggravated homelessness in the Downtown East Side (DTES). 
Using various publications released by the IOCC, CCAP, and PIVOT, this chapter will 
analyze: 1) the roles and priorities of each group regarding housing and homelessness issues in 
Vancouver, 2) what each group thought about the impacts of the 2010 Olympics on housing and 
homelessness issues on the DTES, and 3) the perspective each group took regarding public 
policy and homelessness issues in order to address Olympic-related displacement. By analyzing 
these themes, this chapter will: 1) show that there are many challenges associated with 
establishing parameters for change in housing and homelessness policies within and amongst 
different advocacy groups, 2) illustrate how housing policies have little to no power to protect 
low-income tenants from Olympic-related displacement if public officials do not enforce the 
housing by-laws, and 3) display how homelessness policies, put in place for city beautification 
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purposes, often have negative implications on the homeless by selectively targeting and limiting 
them through police tactics.  
3.1 The Impact of the Olympics on Community Coalition (IOCC) 
 
Comprised primarily of various community activists and academics, the IOCC was 
created in 2002 when Vancouver submitted the first draft of the Olympic bid book for review.1 
The primary goal of the IOCC was to “mitigate the negative impacts of the 2010 Winter Olympic 
and Paralympic Games and to advocate for a rich post-Games, community-based legacy.”2 
Known as the main watchdog group for the Vancouver Games,3 the IOCC’s main role was to 
keep VANOC accountable to its promises of social sustainability and positive impacts. 
Throughout its lifespan (2002 – 2010), the IOCC ran public forums in collaboration with the 
Vancouver Police Department (VPD), civic officials, and local citizens to discuss how social 
issues, such as homelessness and civil liberty violations, might increase in an effort to address 
them ahead of time. The IOCC also worked to establish benefits for inner-city citizens in the 
lead-up to the Games. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the IOCC’s push for adherence to social sustainability issues 
and community benefits led all levels of government to create the 2010 Inclusive Winter Games 
Commitment Statement (ICI) in 2002. Some of the commitments in the ICI included promises to 
“protect rental housing stock,” “ensure people are not made homeless as a result of the Winter 
Games,” “ensure residents are not involuntarily displaced, evicted or face unreasonable increases 
in rent due to the Winter Games,” and “provide an affordable housing legacy.”4 The ICI was 
deemed pivotal in gaining Vancouver the reputation as the most socially sustainable Games in 
Olympic history.5 IOCC organizers declared, “This is the first Games in history that is poised to 
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evolve community-based issues and concerns into legacies.”6 Table 2 illustrates the 
commitments of the ICI. The points of interest for this chapter are bolded. Important to note, 
although the IOCC was known as the main Olympic watchdog group, the politics and 
constituents of the group changed over time, moving away from homelessness to addressing civil 
liberty issues instead.7 The documents analyzed in this chapter reflect that change. More about 
this change will be covered later in the chapter.  
2010 Winter Games Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement 
Accessible Games 
• Develop barrier free venues for people with disabilities. 
• Ensure reasonable accessibility for people with disabilities. 
Affordable Games Events 
• Make affordable tickets available for Vancouver’s low-income inner-city residents, including at risk 
youth and children. 
Affordable Recreation and Community Sport 
• Maximize inner-city residents’ access to the new and public upgraded facilities after the Winter 
Games. 
• Ensure inner-city community centres have equitable access to surplus sporting equipment. 
• Maximize access by inner-city residents, at-risk youth and children to sport and recreational 
initiatives by building from the current sport delivery infrastructure. 
Business Development 
• Develop opportunities for existing and emerging local inner-city businesses and artisans to promote 
their goods and services. 
• Develop potential procurement opportunities for businesses that employ local residents. 
Civil Liberties and Public Safety 
• Provide for lawful, democratic protest that is protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
• Ensure all inner-city residents’ continued access to public spaces before, during and after the 
Games and provide adequate notice of any restrictions of the use of public space/facilities and 
prominently display alternate routes and facilities. 
• Maintain the current level of public safety in inner-city neighbourhoods during the Winter Games. 
• Commit to a timely public consultation that is accessible to inner-city neighbourhoods, before any 
security legislation or regulations are finalized, subject to lawful and legitimate confidentiality 
requirements. 
• Ensure RCMP is the lead agency for security. 
• Reflect the aesthetic design standards of Vancouver in all security related measures. 
Cultural Activities 
• Showcase the diverse cultural, multicultural and aboriginal activities of inner-city residents. 
Employment and Training 
• Create training and a continuum of short and long-term employment opportunities for inner-city 
residents to encourage a net increase in employment. 
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• Provide reasonable wages and decent working conditions for any local working producing Games 
related goods and services before and during the Winter Games. 
Environment 
• Ensure environmental “best practices” in inner-city neighbourhoods. 
Financial Guarantees 
• Provide adequate funds to maintain and operate the new or upgraded public recreational facilities 
after the Games to maximize the number of facilities available to inner-city residents. 
• Provide adequate programming funds for the new or upgraded public recreational facilities to 
encourage a maintenance or increase in recreation programs. 
• Provide disclosure of all financial aspects of the Games, including expenditures and revenues, in the 
bidding and organizing phase of the Games. 
• Commit to a comprehensive annual financial audit. 
Health and Social Services 
• Maintain delivery of health and social services to inner-city residents during the Winter Games. 
• Showcase a commitment to public health issues, including a comprehensive alcohol and drug 
strategy. 
Housing 
• Protect rental housing stock. 
• Provide as many alternative forms of temporary accommodation for Winter Games visitors and 
workers. 
• Ensure people are not made homeless as a result of the Winter Games. 
• Ensure residents are not involuntarily displaced, evicted or face unreasonable increases in rent due 
to the Winter Games. 
• Provide an affordable housing legacy and start planning now. 
Input to Decision-Making 
• Provide inclusive representation on the Bid Corporation’s and Organizing Committee’s Board 
structures and all relevant Bid Corporation and Organizing Committee’s work groups. 
• Ensure inner-city inclusive work continues to operate under the Organizing Committee and its 
Member Partners. 
• Work with and be accessible to an independent watchdog group that includes inner-city residents. 
• Document opportunities and impacts experienced in inner-city neighbourhoods in a comprehensive 
post-Games evaluation with full participation by inner-city residents. 
Neighbourliness 
• Stage events that respect adjacent neighbours. 
Transportation 
• Ensure all Vancouver Games events and venues can be reached by public transit at an affordable 
cost. 
• Minimize any potential adverse transportation impacts on inner-city residents. 
Table 2: This table documents the – commitments made by VANOC and government 
partners to ensure the most socially sustainable Games. These commitments were written 
into a document called the Inner City Inclusive Commitment Statement.8 
To follow up on the ICI, the IOCC published various documents that analyzed VANOC’s 
progress with the aim of assisting VANOC in achieving its ICI commitments. This section will 
analyze four documents released by the IOCC, some of which were written with the IOCC’s 
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participation. In May 2007, the IOCC, along with various housing advocacy groups, members of 
the private sector, and government representatives released a report called the “Report of the 
Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table.” The report outlined twenty-four recommendations 
regarding housing issues in the DTES that VANOC needed to address. The report presented the 
IOCC as a committed partner in bringing about housing change. Soon after the release of the 
Housing Table report, the IOCC published three Olympic Oversight Interim Report Cards (2007, 
2009, 2010) to evaluate whether VANOC and government partners were keeping their promises 
to social and environmental sustainability, civil liberty issues, and budgeting.9 The purpose of the 
report cards was to “identify, both retrospectively and prospectively, which Commitments to date 
have not been substantially met by the parties and which – if current policies prevail – are in 
danger of not being met by the Parties, in the hopes of encouraging greater and more concerted 
efforts to meet the Commitments and to ensure this Olympics has a lasting, positive impact for 
all British Columbians.”10  
In contrast to the IOCC’s commitment to housing issues, the report cards did not address 
policy, housing, or homelessness and, instead, covered mostly civil liberty issues, specifically the 
maltreatment of protesters. This was because many IOCC members were involved with Olympic 
protests. The IOCC and other activist groups experienced greater levels of resistance from the 
VPD when protesting the coming of the Games, prompting a greater focus on civil liberty issues 
in the latter part of the IOCC’s history. Despite the fact that housing issues were an important 
component of the ICI, the report cards only covered one or two instances of housing and 
homelessness violations.  
It is unclear whether the report cards are reliable. They provide no clear rationale for 
what was considered a poor or satisfactory grade, and there are no baseline measures to show 
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what VANOC was supposed to achieve. Explanations provided in the second and third report 
card are not cited, making the source and reliability of data unclear. Furthermore, most of the ICI 
commitments are not even evaluated in the first and second report card. The only consistent 
theme throughout the three report cards is the IOCC’s evaluation of civil liberty and public 
transparency issues. In all, the three report cards are poorly organized with little to no flow 
between them. It is unclear which issues were resolved and which issues were exacerbated, 
making their effectiveness questionable at best.  
Still, the Housing Table report and the three report cards are important sources because 
they reveal the IOCC’s change in advocacy as the years progressed. Although the Housing Table 
report shows that the IOCC was initially committed to analyzing and assisting VANOC with its 
ICI housing commitments, the IOCC’s emphasis on housing priorities declined with each 
subsequent report card. Due to the changing nature of the report, the IOCC’s analysis of each 
housing and homelessness policy was likely not permanently held or shared by the group 
throughout its lifespan. 
3.1.1 Report of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table 
 
In 2007, the IOCC, along with various social advocacy groups, private corporations, and 
representatives from the Government of Canada, the Government of British Columbia, and the 
City of Vancouver created the Housing Table. This multi-sector group was committed to helping 
Vancouver reach its ICI housing commitments. In March 2007, the Housing Table published the 
“Report of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table,” which stated the aim of the group was to 
“develop goals, action plans, and outcomes that will create lasting housing benefits associated 
with the 2010 Games, in the pursuit of the overarching goal of eradicating homelessness.”11 
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Written for VANOC and government partners, the report contained twenty-four 
recommendations to help facilitate the achievement of the five housing commitments listed in 
the ICI. Table 3 lists the five housing commitments and the recommended actions. The bolded 
points are of interest to this chapter. Although the City did not implement most of the 
recommendations, the report revealed that the IOCC was initially committed to resolving 
housing issues and that housing issues was a far-reaching issue that required investment from 
both public and private sectors.  
Commitment Statement Recommended Action 
Provide an Affordable Housing Legacy 1. Build social housing 
2. Build social housing in the Olympic Village 
Protect Rental Housing 3. Purchase or lease existing rental housing 
4. Develop and implement communications 
strategy with VANOC and housing ministries 
5. Re-examine SRA policies 
6. Encourage municipal action to protect rental 
housing 
7. Introduce interim anti-
demolition/conversion measures and 
penalties for vacant buildings 
8. Provide proactive enforcement 
9. Encourage municipal maintenance by-laws 
10. Use property tax incentives to maintain 
affordable rents for renters 
11. Provide funds for education to improve low-
income renting 
12. Reform federal tax system to offset low-
income rental expenses 
13. Expand and change RRAP 
Provide Alternative Forms of Temporary 
Accommodation 
14. Establish a Short-stay Registry for Olympic 
visitors 
15. Create short-stay youth facilities 
16. Build worker housing 
Ensure Homelessness Does Not Increase as a Result 
of the Winter Games 
17. Eliminate barriers to access income 
assistance 
18. Increase income assistance 
19. Increase funding for specific groups 
20. Increase funding for addiction and mental 
health services 
21. Improve local planning and delivery of 
services 
Ensure Residents are not Involuntarily Displaced, 22. Increase assistance for tenants 
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Evicted or Subject to Unreasonable Rent Increases 
as a Result of the Games 
23. Increase Advising Assistance for tenants 
24. Change the RTA 
Table 3: This table shows the recommendations of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table 
to protect and create sustainable housing in the lead up to the Games.12 
The Housing Table identified the construction, protection, and funding of new social 
housing units as the most effective way to eradicate homelessness.13 Regarding housing policy, 
the Housing Table took a proactive stance by recommending amendments to existing policies 
rather than simply identifying the problems. However, the Housing Table noted that measures 
such as the Single Room Accommodation By-law (SRA), Residential Tenancy Act (RTA), and 
Standards of Maintenance By-law (SoM), which regulated the demolition of single-room 
occupancy hotels (SROs), needed to be reassessed and amended. The Housing Table saw the 
enforcement of the by-laws as an “ongoing challenge” that allowed landlords to neglect their 
responsibilities and made homelessness worse in the lead up to the Games.14 There was also 
concern that short-stay workers who were unable to afford conventional hotel accommodations 
or who could not find housing would compete for low-income accommodations and displace the 
tenants.15 
3.1.2 Olympic Oversight Interim Report Card #1 
 
 Then, in May 2007, the IOCC released its first interim report card. The IOCC assigned 
VANOC and government partners an overall grade of D-.16 Initially, the IOCC had assigned 
VANOC and partners an F grade. However, the watchdog group recognized there was still time 
for VANOC to attain the ICI’s promised goals and assigned VANOC a grade of D- instead: a 
marginal improvement but still failing grade. Of the three reports, the IOCC’s first report card 
provided the most detailed assessment of VANOC’s progression and was the only report card to 
reference its supporting arguments. However, only four of the twelve commitments addressed in 
84 
 
 
 
the ICI were actually assessed. The report card assessed issues relating to “housing and 
displacement,” “environmental commitments,” “civil liberty commitments,” and “public 
expenditure and transparency.”17 Table 4 shows the breakdown of the first report card. This 
section will only discuss the IOCC’s analysis of housing and homeless issues. Out of the entire 
report, the IOCC devoted the most coverage to civil liberty issues, spanning ten pages out of the 
thirty page report including appendices. In contrast, its housing assessment spanned only three 
pages. 
Housing and 
Displacement 
Environmental 
Commitments 
Civil Liberty 
Commitments 
Public Expenditure 
and Transparency 
Olympic-related erosion 
of low-income rental 
housing and the lack of 
government response 
Insufficient resources to 
meet sustainability 
commitments 
Implicit/Explicit 
encouragement of civil 
injunctions and criminal 
contempt of court charges 
True cost accounting 
at the municipal level 
 Preferring less 
sustainable modes of 
transportation at 
significant 
environmental cost 
Illegal restrictions on public 
space and the mobility and 
assembly rights of 
protesters in general at 
Games-related events 
True cost accounting 
at the provincial level 
 Environmental legacy 
projects that risk 
degradation of the 
environment 
Attempted exclusion of bid 
partner critics from 
participation in Olympic 
dialogues 
Public entity 
sponsorship by the 
Insurance Corporation 
of British Columbia 
  Use of criminal law to 
intimidate Games critics 
A lack of transparency 
at VANOC 
  Lack of protection for 
criticism, satire, and 
independent media freedom 
of speech 
 
  Proposed legislation and 
policies restricting inner city 
residents’ and homeless 
residents’ use of public 
space, before, during, and 
after the Games 
 
Total Pages: 3 Total Pages: 3 Total Pages: 10 Total Pages: 3 
Table 4: Breakdown of themes covered in the Olympic Interim Report Card # 118 
On housing issues, the IOCC stated, “Vancouver is following historical patterns of 
Games-related evictions”19 in that “specific Olympic-related projects initiated by the municipal 
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government are putting increasing pressure on the low-income rental stock in the inner-city.”20 
Although Olympic developments were leading people to live on the streets, the IOCC claimed 
that the City was “reluctant to enforce by-laws and order repairs, resulting in closures.”21 The 
IOCC also noted that the City was failing to meet the demand for housing caused by SRO 
closures. Contrary to what was promised in the ICI, the IOCC stated there was “minimal 
construction of social housing” in the DTES. It was speculated that very few Olympic social 
housing units would be available to low-income and marginalized populations following the 
Olympic Games. The review was followed by recommendations for VANOC to dedicate funding 
to replace derelict low-income housing.22  
 The IOCC was also concerned about the restriction of public space for homeless citizens 
in the DTES as a means for city beautification.23 The IOCC expressed concern that the City 
would use various policing tactics, including the Project Civil City (PCC), to “restrict inner-city 
residents’ and homeless residents’ use of public space, before, during, and after the Games.”24 
These tactics were criticized as tools to prevent ‘undesirable’ representations of the city from 
being seen in public. There was also concern that the VPD would harass the homeless through 
ticketing and fines, leading the IOCC to believe that homelessness were being criminalized in an 
effort to promote a sanitized image of the city to the world.25  Overall, the IOCC thought that 
homelessness was negatively impacted by the Olympic Games in two ways. First, Vancouver’s 
housing policies were thought to exacerbate homelessness because the City did not enforce them; 
thus, the policies did little to protect tenants from being displaced. Second, the IOCC showed 
that housing policies, such as the PCC, were harmful to the homeless because they selectively 
targeted them through public space restrictions and ticketing.  
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3.1.3  Olympic Oversight Interim Report Card #2 
 
 Two years later, in April 2009, the IOCC published its second report card. According to 
the IOCC, there appeared to be “an over-emphasis on public relations and marketing related to a 
‘socially inclusive’ 2010 Games, rather than a substantive effort to address the real concerns of 
civil society organizations.”26 This theme is echoed in the third report card, suggesting that 
VANOC had marketed its vision for success while neglecting its social commitments to 
Vancouver’s inner-city community as promised in the ICI. The IOCC claimed that many of 
VANOC’s promises were still unmet since the release of the first report card. In response, the 
second report card highlighted how VANOC had moved substantially away from its ICI 
commitments. Indeed, VANOC announced that more than half of the commitments were not 
going to be implemented in time for the Games.27 Contrary to their promise to evaluate all 
commitments listed in the ICI, the IOCC addressed only two in its second report card (“Civil 
Liberty and Public Safety” and “Input to Decision-Making & Transparency”). Table 5 displays a 
thematic breakdown of issues and recommendations covered the second report card and shows 
that the IOCC focused on civil liberty and public consultation issues in the lead up to the Games. 
As displayed by PIVOT and CCAP’s housing data, low-income tenants experienced Olympic-
related displacement and rent increases leading to homelessness. Therefore, the IOCC should 
have prioritized housing issues in its second report card.  
Civil Liberty and Public Safety Input to Decision-Making & Transparency  
Olympic Impact on the homeless: 
Lack of transparency on initiatives to resolve 
homelessness 
VANOC meeting minutes cancelled to prevent public 
access through FOI requests 
VPD: Criminalizing homelessness: 
“Street sweeps” and ticketing 
Sponsorship considerations appearing to influence 
policy and security decisions 
Security Reports and the Criminalization of Dissent Athlete’s Village Fiasco 
Placing Limits on Freedom of Expression Insufficient Inner-City Consultations 
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Security Cameras: Breach of citizen’s rights to privacy Lack of consultation or Discussion over By-law 
Changes and Access to Transportation During the 
Olympics 
 Curbing Freedom of Expression 
Table 5: Breakdown of issues and recommendations covered Olympic Interim Report Card 
# 228 
In the report’s section on civil liberties, the IOCC discussed issues regarding Olympic-
related evictions,29 the restrictions on homeless people in public spaces, increased ticketing, the 
intimidation of critics, and violations to protesters’ freedom of expression.30 The IOCC stated, 
“There has been very little thought put in to dealing with the impacts on the inner-city, and 
particularly on tenants in the city.”31 Furthermore, tenants would continue to be illegally evicted 
if VANOC and government partners did not fix the policy loopholes, especially in the RTA, and 
compensate tenants who were illegally evicted as a result of Olympic-related development.32 The 
IOCC also expressed concern about the potential for the VPD to criminalize and harass the 
homeless by increasing the frequency of ticketing poverty-related offenses in the DTES.33 
Although ticketing was often seen as a practice to deter public disorder and related behaviours, 
homeless people who could not afford rent would not be able to pay the VPD fines. As a result, 
ticketing was a method used to control the presence and behaviours of certain types of people on 
the street. The IOCC assigned VANOC and government partners another D- in the second report 
for failing to meet its stated commitments.   
3.1.4 Olympic Oversight Interim Report Card #3 
 
On February 25, 2010, the IOCC published its third and final Olympic report card. 
VANOC and government partners were once again assigned a failing grade of D-. Similar to the 
second report card, the IOCC noted that VANOC and government partners “followed a pattern 
of distorted documentation that looked at the benefits of the 2010 Olympics Games while not 
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adequately acknowledging the impacts.”34  The IOCC was referring to the massive cost overruns 
that were not reported in VANOC’s financial documents and the fact that there was a lack of 
transparency between VANOC and the public regarding those costs. The IOCC’s reports suggest 
that VANOC never intended to address ICI commitments from the start. Furthermore, there is a 
reoccurring theme of how negative images are hidden from public view in preparation for the 
Olympic Games. In VANOC’s case, Olympic project costs were not honestly relayed to the 
public, leading the public to believe that the Games were helping the city more than they actually 
were. 
Unlike the first and second reports, the third report card assessed all of the issues listed in 
the ICI and assigned grades to each area of concern, although this should have been done in all 
report cards. As noted in Section 3.1, the IOCC did not explain how each grade was assigned, so 
it was unclear what the grades were actually assessing. Furthermore, it was unclear how the 
IOCC came to these conclusions since there was no discussion of most of the issues in the 
previous two reports. The highest grade assigned in the third report card was C+ for making the 
Games accessible for visitors with disabilities. The lowest grade assigned was F-, for the 
restrictions on critics’ freedom of speech, finances, accessibility of health and social services to 
inner-city residents, housing, and public consultation. Table 6 illustrates the mark break-down 
for the third report card.  
C+ C- D- F- 
Accessibility 
• The Games 
were not 
accessible for 
people with 
disabilities. 
Affordability 
• General public 
and inner-city 
citizens found 
attending the 
Games 
expensive. 
Affordable Recreation and 
Community Sport 
• No plans for public 
use of facilities. 
Cultural Activities 
• Opening 
Ceremonies did 
not reflect 
multicultural 
community. 
 Business Development Business Development Financial Guarantees 
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• Some DTES 
businesses 
were 
negatively 
impacted. 
• Locals should have 
been hired for 
construction work. 
• VANOC spent 
much more on the 
Games than 
promised.  
  Civil Liberties 
• Civil liberties were 
violated due to 
restrictions on 
protesters’ access 
to public space, 
restrictive sign by-
laws, protesters’ 
signage removal, 
increased 
surveillance, and 
police infiltration of 
activist 
organizations. 
Health, Social Services/ 
Housing 
• Homelessness has 
doubled and there 
was a huge loss of 
housing stock in 
the DTES.  
  Environment 
• Environmental 
effects of the 
Games were 
negative. No detail 
provided.  
Input to Decision-Making 
• There was very 
little involvement 
of the inner-city 
community in the 
planning process.  
  Neighbourliness 
• Consultations with 
related 
organizations were 
not completed 
well.  
 
  Transportation 
• Transportation 
could have 
contributed to 
sustainability. No 
detail provided. 
 
OVERALL GRADE: D- 
Table 6: This table displays the IOCC’s mark breakdown of how well VANOC and 
government partners achieved ICI commitments.35 
Unlike the first and second report card, there was no mention of public space restrictions 
for inner-city residents in the third report. Much of the discussion surrounding civil liberties 
documented the ways protesters and critics were limited in expression and protest. In its 
assessment of housing issues, the IOCC gave VANOC and government partners an F- for the 
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City’s mismanagement of housing units and the lack of an effective housing plan following the 
Games. The IOCC noted that recommendations to combat homelessness were ignored and that 
homelessness had doubled in number as Vancouver had lost more than 1000 SRO living units 
within the seven year period of the bid victory.36  
Collectively, the IOCC’s three report cards reveal that housing and homelessness issues 
were impacted negatively by the Games. First, low-income tenants were adversely affected by 
the Games because landlords took advantage of loopholes in the housing policies, which the City 
had repeatedly failed to enforce. As a result, low-income tenants experienced Olympic-related 
evictions and rent increases. Second, homelessness was exacerbated by city beautification 
policies that aimed to erase the homeless from view through red-zoning and ticketing. Contrary 
to the Housing Table report, the IOCC’s report cards positioned housing issues as irrelevant 
because most of their coverage was devoted to civil liberty and public consultation issues 
instead. As a result, the report cards were misleading because research conducted by CCAP and 
PIVOT showed that the decline of available low-income housing stock was contributing to a 
homelessness crisis in Vancouver.  
3.2 IOCC’s Stance on Homelessness, Policy, and the Olympics 
 
3.2.1 Standards of Maintenance By-law 
 
In the first interim report card, the IOCC noted that the City had “declined to use or 
modify (if required) the Standards of Maintenance to allow the city to ensure habitable standards 
in Downtown Eastside lodging houses.”37 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the SoM allowed the City 
to initiate repairs in substandard buildings and to bill the landlord afterwards. However, the 
IOCC noted that even though the SoM was put in place to protect tenants, the City had 
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consistently failed to take advantage of the by-law and initiate the necessary repairs.38  Buildings 
that were closed by the City for violating the SoM were then sold for redevelopment into market 
housing, reducing the amount of available low-income housing stock.39 The City’s repeated 
failure to enforce housing policies prompted many landlords to violate the housing by-laws 
knowing they would not have to face the consequences of breaking the law.  
The Housing Table was also concerned that violations to the SoM would allow landlords 
to bypass the conditions of the SRA, which regulated the demolition and conversion of SROs, 
stating, “some landlords deliberately neglect their buildings, and thus facilitate the approval of a 
demolition application.”40 As a result, the Housing Table called for a greater level of policy 
enforcement, especially regarding the City’s ability to enter and repair sub-standard buildings. 
Enforcement was essential because it would “improve [living] conditions while keeping 
buildings open.”41 The poor enforcement of policies also allowed landlords to exploit other 
housing policies working to protect tenants. As a result, there were multiple ways that low-
income tenants could be displaced through Olympic-related development. 
3.2.2 Residential Tenancy Act 
 
In its second interim report card, the IOCC asserted, “Given the resources being invested 
into the 2010 Olympic Games, there has been very little thought put into dealing with the 
impacts of the inner-city and particularly on tenants in the city.”42 The IOCC saw that many 
people would become homeless when landlords exploited loopholes in the RTA causing 
“renovictions” to occur.43 As explained in Chapter 2, renovictions occur when landlords illegally 
evict their tenants in order to renovate their property to profit from rising market housing values. 
The IOCC calculated that 2000 SRO living units would be lost to Olympic-related renovictions 
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because of loopholes in the RTA and the City’s poor enforcement of the legislation.44 The IOCC 
stated there were numerous residents from at least eight SROs who were forcibly evicted or who 
faced illegal eviction.45 The most notorious case was when the owner of the Golden Crown Hotel 
announced on national television that he was evicting his tenants in order to accommodate 
employees and construction workers for Olympic projects.46 The IOCC speculated that other 
landlords would increase their rents to provide accommodations for Olympic workers as well. As 
such, the IOCC suggested that the poor enforcement of the RTA was what caused mass evictions 
in the lead-up to the Olympic Games. Thus, the IOCC recognized that homelessness was 
exacerbated because tenants were being illegally evicted by landlords who wanted to profit from 
the Games and because the City did not enforce the RTA. In this way, the City was contributing 
to the homelessness crisis. 
The Housing Table made three recommendations to amend the RTA. First, the City 
should compensate or replace housing for tenants who experienced renovictions.47 This was a 
rather progressive stance on amending the RTA, because instead of recommending policies to 
prevent renovictions, the Housing Table recommended that tenants be protected in the event they 
were evicted. As such, this recommendation presented a different way of addressing 
homelessness. Contrary to the CCAP and PIVOT, whose focus was on existing loopholes in the 
RTA, the Housing Table recognized that loopholes and renovictions were inevitable and chose to 
address homelessness via a harm reduction model instead, demonstrating that amendments to 
housing policy needed to be creative in order to address the various and complex ways that 
people were being displaced. Second, recommendations were also made to allow tenants the 
right to refuse paying overly high rent increases following renovations.48 Third, 
recommendations were made to ensure that rental rates were tied to the unit rather than the 
93 
 
 
 
tenant.49 The Housing Table noted that the three recommendations were put in place “to ensure 
that the health and safety of existing residents, particularly residents of SRAs, is protected and 
that these residents are not faced with unreasonable rent increases or displacement.”50 It is worth 
nothing that all private sector representatives of the Housing Table disagreed with the three 
recommendations. This is important because the potential for private owners to profit from their 
property could be comprised if amendments to rent increases, evictions, and renovations were 
put in place. This disagreement between the private and public sector representatives regarding 
the RTA sheds light on how difficult it is to establish agreement on policy recommendations 
because each sector has different views and priorities regarding the creation and use of housing 
policies.  
3.2.3 Single Room Accommodation By-law 
 
The SRA was not mentioned in any of the IOCC’s report cards. Considering that the SRA 
was created specifically to decrease the conversion and demolition of SRO hotels, coupled with 
the fact that SRO stock decreased before the Olympic Games, it is strange that the IOCC did not 
analyze the SRA. This suggests that housing issues became less of a priority for the IOCC as the 
Games approached. However, the Housing Table covered the SRA extensively, and 
recommended to the City that it set goals for a one-to-one replacement of all demolished SRO 
units, as well as higher demolition or conversion fees to deter property owners from converting 
their property.51 Additionally, the Housing Table recommended introducing stricter measures for 
the application for conversion and demolition, and greater penalties for SRA violations. These 
recommendations were made because housing advocacy representatives were concerned that 
increasing development pressures and extremely low vacancy rates would place greater pressure 
on the SRO rental stock.52 Perhaps it was no surprise that private sector representatives disagreed 
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with these recommendations, arguing they were “punitive and counter-productive,”53 and, 
instead, proposed the City engage the private sector in a partnership “to develop a mixture of 
initiatives” to protect declining SRO stock.54 It is unclear to what “mixture of initiatives” refers. 
However, it was clear that changes made to the SRA would deeply affect the way SRO owners 
held control over their living units and their ability to profit from these units, which made the 
private sector uneasy about policy changes and enforcement.  
The private sector’s disagreement with the Housing Table illustrates, yet again, the 
challenges of addressing issues and solutions related to homeless and housing policy. Although 
both public and private sectors acknowledged that homelessness and the threat of displacement 
was a pressing issue, both parties held different ideas regarding possible solutions. Furthermore, 
the issue is complicated by the fact that much of the SRO housing stock is owned by the private 
sector, and there are a different set of risks and commitments involved when housing by-laws 
were amended. For example, increased conversion fees applied to living units can negatively 
affect a landlord’s profit if they are already losing money due to vacancies, and cannot convert 
their property due to high conversion fees. The Housing Table illustrates the difficulty in trying 
to create policy recommendations because of the multiple voices and players invested and 
involved in these negotiations.  
3.2.4 Project Civil City 
 
Of the nine documents analyzed in this chapter, the IOCC commented most on the PCC. 
The PCC is interesting because neither the IOCC, CCAP, PIVOT identified the PCC as a critical 
tool that aggravated homelessness in the lead up to the Vancouver Games. On the contrary, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, it was representatives from opposing political parties who expressed the 
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most hostility to the PCC. Even more telling, their hostility was directed not at the PCC’s 
effectiveness per se, but at whether the policy was needed at all. Specifically, the politicians were 
most unsettled with the spending of public tax dollars on an initiative they felt was unnecessary, 
which speaks to the level of support for homelessness issues in Vancouver.  
What did the IOCC have to say about the PCC? From the very first Olympic interim 
report card, the IOCC expressed concern regarding the PCC because it was perceived as an 
initiative that disadvantaged marginalized populations in the DTES. Coined as a “beautification 
project,”55 the IOCC criticized the PCC as a policy “designed expressly for the purpose of 
limiting the poorest and most marginalized inner-city residents’ access to public spaces in 
Vancouver during the Games.”56 As explained in Chapter 1, the practice of preventing homeless 
people from accessing public space is called “red-zoning.” Through “continued harassment by 
private and public police,” ‘undesirable’ individuals are kept from using public space before, 
during, and after the Games.57 For Vancouver 2010, police officers were employed to move 
homeless people from the doorways of businesses and instructed to throw away their belongings 
when left unattended.58 Their ability to access public space was also compromised when police 
cordoned off public parks traditionally used by the homeless as sleeping areas.59 These 
limitations had negative implications for the homeless because it affected their ability to remain 
in a public space, whom some felt was safer than places offering assistance. For example, the 
homeless often choose to sleep on the street to prevent theft or confiscation of their items in 
over-night shelters.  
The homeless also experienced increased ticketing prior to the start of the Games. The 
IOCC explained that police ticketed homeless individuals for illegal vending because they often 
left their belongings unattended in the streets or in shopping carts. As a result, the IOCC argued 
96 
 
 
 
that homelessness was being criminalized, and recommended several times that the VPD stop 
conducting street sweeps, excessive ticketing, and forcefully removing homeless people from 
public spaces.60 The PCC illustrates how a major public policy initiative, which was intended to 
promote public safety by decreasing public disorder, disadvantaged marginalized populations 
because it disproportionately targeted them through harsh policing tactics such as red-zoning and 
ticketing.  
3.2.5 Assistance to Shelter Act 
 
The ASA was not mentioned in any of the IOCC’s documents. This is surprising because 
the ASA was heavily criticized by PIVOT and the CCAP as a beautification tool for the Games. 
The timing of the legislation, as well as the vaguely defined terms included in the ASA, sparked 
debates among activist communities in the DTES. David Eby, a member of PIVOT and the 
IOCC, was the most prominent critic of the ASA. Furthermore, the IOCC was concerned about 
the limitation of public space for inner-city citizens, which was a priority in the first and second 
report cards. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely the IOCC did not know about the ASA, making 
its silence all that more curious.  
3.3 Carnegie Community Action Plan 
 
A project extension of the Carnegie Community Centre Association, CCAP was a large 
social advocacy group that fought for housing, income, and land use issues in the DTES. CCAP 
was first formed in 1996 as a research and advocacy organization whose goal was “to track the 
real effects of poverty and gentrification on low-income DTES people, and to seek to protect and 
expand the assets and tenure of the low-income community in the neighbourhood.”61  Its 
research was based largely on a collection of testimonials and life stories from low-income 
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residents regarding gentrification and eviction. Since 2008, the CCAP had been publishing 
reports that documented the status of low-income residents, SROs, gentrification, evictions, and 
homelessness. This chapter will focus on the reports that coincided with the years leading up to 
the Vancouver Olympics (2008, 2009, and 2010). These reports are important because they 
provide evidence as to how homelessness increased in the lead up to the 2010 Games. The 
reports also reveal that CCAP placed greater emphasis on presenting the facts and testimonies of 
low-income tenants and less on critiquing the role of Vancouver’s housing and homelessness 
policies. In comparison to the IOCC and PIVOT, CCAP commented the least on housing policy 
issues.  
3.3.1 2008 CCAP Residential Hotel Situation Report 
 
In April 2008, CCAP released its first annual CCAP Residential Hotel Situation Report, 
titled, “Disappearing Homes: The Loss of Affordable Housing in the DTES.” The report 
summarized a study on the status of SRO hotels and the actual living conditions of the SRO 
residents in the DTES. In total, ninety-seven privately-owned SRO hotels were included in the 
study.62 Researchers acted as prospective tenants and surveyed each hotel as renters, asking a 
series of questions regarding vacancy, rental rates, damage deposits, and eligibility for rent. They 
took note of which buildings had signs for conversion, demolition, or sale. Non-profit hotels and 
provincially-owned hotels were excluded from the survey.63  CCAP found that 46% of the rooms 
surveyed were “closed, unaffordable by people on welfare, or in grave danger of closing or 
becoming unaffordable.”64 Only twenty of the ninety-seven hotels in the survey had rooms that 
rented for $375 or lower, despite the fact that the welfare rate in British Columbia was capped at 
$375 per month. Among the twenty hotels mentioned in the 2008 report, only six rooms were 
vacant and available for rent.65  
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CCAP speculated that the low-income housing situation would undergo even greater 
strain because of the Games.66 Low-income tenants were unable to rent the living units in the 
DTES because the units were undergoing “soft conversion.” Soft conversions occur when 
landlords make their living units inaccessible to low-income residents by increasing rent, 
restricting occupants to tourists, or renting by the day or week.67 CCAP coined living units with 
rent increases as soft conversions because it was no longer affordable for low-income citizens, 
but it was not being formally converted to another type of rental unit.68 SRO buildings, which 
catered to tourists through daily and weekly rentals, were considered soft conversions because 
rental rates were more expensive than SRO units renting out at monthly rates, thus tightening the 
number of vacant units available for low-income citizens. According to the SRA by-law, daily 
and weekly rentals were illegal. Despite the fact that soft conversions violated the SRA, “no 
level of government [was] actively working to stop these closures and soft conversions.”69 
CCAP’s research on soft conversions is its greatest contribution to the housing situation in the 
DTES because it showed how housing units were made unavailable to low-income citizens 
through rent increases or rent restrictions that went unaddressed by the City. Of all the watchdog 
groups analyzed in this chapter, CCAP was the only group to recognize this subtle form of 
eviction.  
3.3.2 2009 Hotel Survey and Report 
 
 In June 2009, CCAP published its second annual hotel survey report, titled, “Still Losing 
Hotel Rooms.”  Similar to the 2008 report, the CCAP approached hotels as prospective renters 
and asked about vacancies, rental rates, and eligibility of occupancy.70 The 2009 survey included 
sixty-three SRO hotels with a total of 3268 rooms. Again, CCAP was concerned that “during the 
2010 Olympics, hotels will evict monthly residents so they can rent to tourists.”71 To be sure, 
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hotels were openly advertising for weekly and daily vacancies for the upcoming Games even 
though it was a violation of the SRA. One hotel, near the Olympic Village, made its location its 
prime selling feature. This led CCAP to speculate that the “hotels are actively seeking 
daily/weekly guests and could be on the verge of trying to get more guests for the Olympics.”72 
CCAP found that vacancy rates in 2009 were relatively the same as those in 2008. Yet, the 
number of rooms renting at over $425 had increased by 44%.73 Comparing the 2008 and 2009 
report, CCAP’s data revealed that the ability of low-income renters to pay for rent and associated 
living costs and/or find an affordable living unit became most difficult one year prior to the 
Games.  
3.3.3 2010 CCAP Residential Hotel Situation Report 
 
 In September 2010, CCAP published its third SRO status report, titled, “Pushed Out: 
Escalating Rents in the Downtown Eastside,” which surveyed ninety SRO hotels in the DTES. 
Unlike the previous two reports, there was no mention of the Olympic Games in the 2010 report. 
However, CCAP noted that trends regarding hotel closures, gentrification, and lack of effective 
rent control persisted in 2010. Moreover, despite the opening of newly built provincially-owned 
units between 2009 and 2010, CCAP noted that Vancouver had experienced a 12% increase in 
homelessness since 2008, suggesting the City did not sufficiently address housing and 
homelessness issues in the lead-up to the Games.74 Although it may appear that gentrification 
and hotel closures were unrelated to the Games, since gentrification and hotel closures occurred 
before and after the Games, research has shown the Olympic Games has a far-reaching effect on 
a city’s housing market. For instance, gentrification and eviction trends associated with the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games reveal that gentrification, demolition, and construction of new units 
occurred and eventually peaked at an all-time high a decade after the 1988 Games were held.75 
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Each of CCAP’s subsequent reports, published in 2011, 2012, and 2013, expressed concern 
regarding the rapid rates of gentrification among SRO hotels, thus reflecting similar trends in 
eviction after the Games, as recorded in Seoul. Regarding soft conversions, CCAP identified 
only one SRO hotel as renting on a daily/weekly basis after the Games. This was a significant 
decrease from 2009, in which seven hotels were found to have rented to tourists only. The 
decline in daily/weekly rentals may be attributed to a smaller influx of tourists following the 
conclusion of the Games. As a result, CCAP’s research indicates that the financially lucrative 
Games were a motivating factor for SRO hotel owners to rent out their living units to tourists. 
3.4 CCAP’s Stance on Homelessness, Policy and the Olympics 
 
3.4.1 Standards of Maintenance By-law 
 
CCAP recognized that the state of SROs was substandard and, in most cases, 
unliveable.76 Many tenants lived in pest-ridden, aged, filthy units that did not meet basic health 
and safety standards.77 Many of these living conditions also violated the SoM. Similar to the 
IOCC, CCAP noted that SRO closures occurred when the City refused to use the SoM to do the 
required repairs and bill the owners. Closures also happened when owners evicted tenants to 
make the building easier to sell “in a hot condo market, fuelled by expansion of the Downtown 
Core…and the coming Olympics.”78 CCAP pointed out that the Games were a major source of 
motivation for landlords to exploit the SoM and SRA as tools to convert their buildings into 
market housing units. 
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3.4.2 Residential Tenancy Act 
 
CCAP expressed three major concerns with the RTA. First, the CCAP noted that “current 
rent control measures are virtually useless in the DTES” because the RTA had little to no 
provisions to regulate rent increases following the departure of a tenant from a living unit.79 As a 
result, property owners could increase and charge rents to new tenants at market housing 
values.80 This tactic limited the number of SRO units that were accessible and affordable to low-
income DTES citizens. Second, CCAP had concerns with the RTA’s arbitration process. 
Although the RTA made provisions for tenants who were charged illegal rental rates, challenging 
rent increases was a financially prohibitive and time-consuming process. As a result, many 
tenants were deterred from asserting their rights in the first place. Third, CCAP was concerned 
about tenant’s rights under provincially-run SRO hotels. As noted in Chapter 2, provincially-run 
buildings and non-profit organizations were not subject to the RTA. Although provincially-
owned hotels had better management and living conditions than privately owned SROs, due to 
the transitional nature of these provincially funded hotels, CCAP did not consider these living 
units to be secure sources of proper housing. CCAP explained that managers of provincially-run 
buildings had “an extraordinary amount of power over residents and that, occasionally, this has 
caused homelessness.”81 Landlords had the power to revoke tenancies immediately and tenants 
had no right to enforce their rights under the RTA. As such, SRO tenants were especially 
helpless in appealing rent increases. CCAP showed the multiple ways tenants were vulnerable to 
losing their tenancies, and these concerns were echoed by the IOCC and PIVOT. 
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3.4.3 Single Room Accommodation By-law 
 
In response to the drastic decline of living units in the DTES, CCAP noted, “The SRA 
bylaw to protect the SRO stock is clearly not working”82 and “we fear these rooms could be lost 
when pressure for Olympic housing ramps up if the city refuses to enforce its SRA bylaw.”83 
Loopholes in the SRA created soft conversions through tourist-only renting or renting for other 
residential uses. Soft conversions are a good indicator of how the Olympic Games negatively 
impact the low-income housing market because increases in SRO-tourist buildings decrease the 
number of living units available to the low-income community. Figure 3 depicts the number of 
SRO buildings that were rented out for tourist use in the lead-up to the 2010 Games. 
 In 2008, CCAP identified six hotels renting on a daily or weekly basis to tourists.84 
Average rates of SROs converted for tourist use charged $40 per night or $200 dollars per week, 
which was much more expensive than what low-income citizens could afford.85 In 2009, CCAP 
identified seven hotels that were renting to tourists. CCAP believed these hotel owners were 
motivated by the Olympic Games because six of the seven aforementioned SROs advertised 
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Figure 3: All SRO buildings renting to tourists at $40/night or $200/week.86 
living units on a hostel website.87 In 2010, CCAP found only one hotel renting at a daily or 
weekly rate to tourists.88 This was a significant drop from the number of tourist hotels existing in 
2008 and 2009, suggesting that a decrease in Olympic tourism motivated owners to convert their 
property back to rentals for low-income citizens. This also shows that low-income tenants were 
seen as disposable and therefore displaced for profit-making purposes. 
3.4.4 Project Civil City 
 
In all of the documents published by CCAP, there was no mention of the PCC. This is not 
surprising because most of CCAP’s research focused mainly low-income housing issues in the 
DTES. That being said, CCAP did discuss the PCC in blog posts and related social media 
platforms, but these sources were not included as part of the data collection for this thesis. Unlike 
the IOCC and PIVOT, which took issue with the PCC’s potential to violate human rights, CCAP 
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was more concerned about failed commitments to provide social housing. Jean Swanson, director 
of CCAP noted, “Rooming houses and hotels are falling like flies…that’s 2,400 of low-income 
housing likely to vanish before the Olympics.”89 CCAP’s concern for housing stock illustrates 
how the concerns and priorities of the three housing advocacy groups varied even though the 
same policies were critiqued.  
3.4.5 Assistance to Shelter Act 
 
In all the documents published by the CCAP, there was no mention of the ASA. 
However, to be explored in Section 3.6.5, newspaper sources reveal that CCAP advocated 
against the ASA because it was seen as unconstitutional and poorly planned.  
3.5 PIVOT Legal Society 
 
In the fall of 2000, a law school student named John Richardson listened to a homeless 
man recall his experiences with police harassment in the DTES. After hearing similar testimonies 
from a variety of people, in 2003, Richardson responded by creating a legal firm called PIVOT 
Legal Society. The purpose of PIVOT was to advocate for DTES citizens and “carry out legal 
campaigns around policing, housing, and sex work that would result in meaningful positive 
change for people living in poverty.”90 The term “PIVOT” referred to the exertion of “maximum 
pressure in order to shift society toward greater equality and inclusivity,” and represented the 
firm’s approach to social change. As a network of lawyers, academics, and volunteers, PIVOT’s 
goal was to “use the law to address the root causes of poverty and social inclusion.”91 Some of 
PIVOT’s work included rallying for legislative reforms, fighting evictions, and challenging 
unconstitutional legislation. Similar to CCAP, PIVOT’s work involved a close collaboration with 
low-income and marginalized citizens in order to fight for change in the DTES.  
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This section will analyze two of PIVOT’s publications. The first report is “Cracks in the 
Foundation: Solving the Housing Crisis in Canada’s Poorest Neighbourhood,” which reviewed 
the state of homelessness, policy, and evictions in the lead-up to the Olympic Games. This report 
is particularly important because it prompted other advocacy groups, such as CCAP, to create 
follow-up reports on the housing situation in the DTES. The second report, which was submitted 
to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, documented the ways human 
rights were being violated in order to host the 2010 Olympic Games. 
3.5.1 “Cracks in the Foundation” 
 
 In September 2006, PIVOT published a 96-page report titled “Cracks in the Foundation: 
Solving the Housing Crisis in Canada’s Poorest Neighbourhood.” The report’s introduction 
stated, “Without immediate action, the estimated 2.3 million visitors to the Games will see a City 
in the midst of an urban epidemic of poverty, and witness the clear evidence of a broken 
commitment to address the impact of the Olympics.”92 The broken commitment referred to the 
promises made by VANOC and government partners in the ICI. Split into seventeen parts, the 
report summarized PIVOT’s research regarding poverty, homelessness, rising rental rates, 
accelerating market housing development, and the living conditions of SRO hotels. “Cracks in 
the Foundation” was one of the first reports to detail the housing situation in the DTES using 
personal interviews with SRO residents. Therefore, this report provided information that City 
housing reports did not provide, such as the quality of living in SRO hotel units and various 
injustices that SRO residents experienced with landlords and police. This report later spurred 
CCAP and other housing advocates to create follow-up reports on the housing situation in the 
DTES. This section will only focus on the issues surrounding the Olympic Games.  
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 Between June 2005 and June 2006, a group of PIVOT lawyers, volunteers, students, and 
social workers collected affidavits from 160 DTES residents regarding their living experiences in 
the SROs. The affidavits were used to identify common factors that prevented residents from 
accessing low-income housing in the DTES.93 The most common issues included a lack of 
affordable housing, difficulty accessing social assistance, illegal retention of damage deposits, 
landlord discrimination, illegal invasion of property by landlords, denial of utilities and services 
to tenants, substandard living conditions of SROs, illegal guest restriction, violent hotel 
managers, pest infestations, poor enforcement of policies and by-laws, gentrification, 
infringement of privacy rights, homelessness, and police inaction.94  
 Of all those issues, gentrification was identified as one of the greatest factors that led to 
the loss of affordable housing in the DTES because it led to SROs being closed, converted, and 
redeveloped into market housing. PIVOT attributed the gentrification to the coming Olympic 
Games, noting, “These losses not only denote a quickly shrinking SRO stock, but also signify the 
ongoing process of attrition that characterizes gentrification: a process that shows signs of 
accelerating as the 2010 Olympic Games approach.”95 Coined the “Olympic effect,” PIVOT 
stated, “factors like the hot real estate market and the upcoming Olympics” affected real estate 
prices because property owners selectively bought property in the area to profit from the 
Games.96 Evictions also increased as Olympic construction workers placed greater pressure on 
Vancouver’s housing market, motivating SRO owners to increase rental rates or rent their units 
on a daily and weekly basis.97 Of all the documents analyzed in this chapter, PIVOT’s report, 
“Cracks in the Foundation” gave the most comprehensive coverage of the homeless situation in 
the DTES and how Vancouver’s housing policies affected homelessness. Unlike CCAP’s 
reports, which focused mostly on the facts and statistics of homelessness in the DTES, PIVOT’s 
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report explained the ways in which homelessness was exacerbated as a direct result of loopholes 
in legislation.  
3.5.2 Submissions of PIVOT Legal Society to the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 
Universal Periodic Review of Canada 
 
On September 8, 2008, PIVOT submitted a report, titled, “Submissions of PIVOT Legal 
Society to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Universal Periodic 
Review of Canada” stating, “the federal, provincial, and municipal governments of Canada are 
not upholding basic human rights standards associated with the right to adequate housing in 
Vancouver, British Columbia leading up to the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games.”98 
Of all the documents analyzed for this thesis, “Submissions” was the only report to recognize 
that human rights were being violated due to illegal housing practices and police-based policy 
initiatives that were put in place to prepare for the Games.99  
3.6 PIVOT’s Stance on Housing Policy and the Olympics 
 
3.6.1 Standards of Maintenance By-law 
 
Of the three groups, PIVOT presented the most comprehensive analysis of the SoM, 
focusing on two main themes. First, similar to the IOCC and CCAP, PIVOT argued the City had 
the power to enter substandard buildings, fix repairs, and bill the owners,100 but that it was 
“negligent” in identifying and ordering standards of maintenance repairs.101 In 1999, the City 
gave out 106 orders to SRO owners to mend their derelict buildings. In 2005, they City issued 
eight orders for repairs, and in 2006, it issued six. Meanwhile, health hazards, infestations, 
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insufficient heating, and a lack of utilities which plagued the majority of SRO stock in the DTES 
was on the rise.102 Regarding sanitation in the hotels, one tenant testified, “The building is very 
dirty. The floors are very dirty, you have to wear your shoes even in your room. There is 
garbage, blood and shit in the bathrooms; they are filthy.”103 Another tenant recounted his 
experiences with bed bugs, which was a common occurrence in SROs: “I have bed bugs. My 
place is infested with them. I have been up since 4 a.m. this morning because the bed bugs wake 
me up. I can’t sleep at all. They bite me all over. I have bites all over my feet and legs… 
Management does not care at all. I tell them. They just don’t care.”104 These testimonies show 
that the living conditions of many SROs were severe but preventable if the City had inspected 
SRO buildings on a regular basis.  
In the instance where the City identified a problem in an SRO, it usually opted to close 
the building rather than take extra steps to bill the owner. As a result, SoM enforcement resulted 
in a significant number of SRO closures in the DTES.105 PIVOT thus showed how the City failed 
to prevent the degradation of SROs, while increasing homelessness by closing the SROs rather 
than initiating repairs. Therefore, low-income residents experienced additional hardships because 
the City did not proactively protect the tenants.  
3.6.2 Residential Tenancy Act 
 
PIVOT was also concerned about the RTA’s rent control system, which allowed 
landlords to charge new tenants increased rental rates after the previous tenants had moved 
out.106  Although the City had set an annual maximum rent increase, PIVOT, along with CCAP, 
recognized that residents occupying non-profit or provincially-owned housing units were not 
protected by the RTA.107 In the past, this exemption prevented tenants from appealing rent 
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increases “based on mistaken assumptions about a tenant’s income level.”108 In “Cracks in the 
Foundation,” one female tenant said that her rent increased $150 because of a misunderstanding 
about her income level. She did not receive a notice of eviction and her landlord had no evidence 
to justify the rent increase. It all happened so suddenly, she said. Furthermore, she could not 
appeal the rent increase because her building did not fall under the RTA.109 As a result of the 
loophole in the RTA, tenants were vulnerable to eviction because they had no opportunity to 
fight for their rights as tenants.  
If arbitration did apply, the tenants were often unaware of the how the process worked 
because they had “limited education, mental health problems, addictions, and little access to 
transportation.”110 Furthermore, arbitration was often not feasible because they lacked the 
financial resources to use the system. Thus, even when tenants had the capacity and resources to 
enter into dispute, many users experienced difficulty protecting their rights because the system 
was incredibly complex. As one tenant explained,  
Later in the morning on Thursday the 6th of July I went to the Provincial Court 
Registry to file the Residential Arbitration Order and Certificate of Service for the 
Melynchuck file. […] I was not allowed to file these documents because I had not 
completed a Change of Address form, and I was missing the original copy of the 
Decisions and Reasons of the Arbitrator. I returned to the Pivot office, filled out a 
Change of Address form and found the original Decisions and Reasons. I then 
returned to the Provincial Court Registry. Again I was not allowed to file the 
documents. The clerk asserted that only Residential Arbitration Orders can be 
filed and that Decisions and Reasons of the Arbitrator were insufficient. I returned 
to the Provincial Court Registry this morning on Friday July 7th. Upon receiving 
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service I was told for a third time that I was unable to file the [Residential 
Arbitration Order and Certificate of Service for the Melynchuck file]. My attempt 
to file them was dismissed because I was unable to swear that an appeal had not 
been filed against the Residential Arbitration Order.111  
This tenant’s experience illustrates the convoluted nature of the arbitration process. As a result, 
tenants were often deterred from appealing wrongful charges or claims. However, this also 
meant that they had no other way to assert their rights or to appeal wrongful charges, such as 
illegal evictions or high rent increases.  
There were instances in which landlords threatened tenants to prevent them from 
disputing a claim in the first place. One tenant explained,  
I took the eviction notice that they had given me to the Residential Housing 
people, and they told me that the notice on which my eviction was written was 
obsolete, and that the landlord had to give me a new form. However, I got 
threatened by [the SRO] management to leave. They threatened me with violence, 
taking my stuff, and calling the police. I knew I had rights and I was ready to 
stand up for them. I didn’t pursue the wrongful eviction.112  
As the Games approached, even more tenants were illegally evicted or were threatened with 
eviction.113  One affidavit noted,  
About eight months after I moved in the landlord told me that I was getting 
evicted because I had too many guests. He did not give me any warning. I left to 
go find a place to store my things and when I came back I saw my clothes and my 
hat in the garbage bin behind the hotel. I went up to my room and it was empty. 
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[…] I have been living on the street ever since I was evicted from the Cordova 
Rooms.114  
Corrupt landlord practices disadvantaged tenants because, if they made an attempt to expose 
what was happening by seeking redress through the RTA system, they risked losing their living 
unit. Compounding these problems, the Residential Tenancy Branch often lacked the resources, 
and was sometimes unwilling, to assist tenants.115 One affidavit noted, “On January 12, 2006, 
[my landlord] knocked on my door at about 9 a.m. and told me that I had until 5p.m. to be out of 
the building. I went to the residential tenancy office in Burnaby and asked them what I should do 
about it. They told me they couldn’t do anything because it was 4:15p.m. and too late to file 
anything.”116 It was a no-win situation for tenants.   
3.6.3 Single Room Accommodation By-law 
 
In “Submissions of PIVOT Legal Society to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights for the Universal Periodic Review of Canada,” PIVOT argued, “the City has 
failed to enforce the by-law preventing the conversion of SROs into tourist accommodation,”117 
with the result that “the intended effect of this by-law has been circumvented.”118 This was 
written in response to the City’s closure of a number of SRO buildings because they violated the 
SoM. However, the owners took advantage of the process, converting their property into SRO 
hotels for tourist use.119 In so doing, they were able to avoid paying the hefty demolition and 
conversion fee required by the City.120 
The case of the American Hotel is a good illustration of how many SRO tenants were 
illegally evicted. On August 1, 2006, every tenant occupying the American Hotel, an old SRO 
located in the DTES, was given an eviction notice, notifying them that the building was to be 
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evacuated on September 30, 2006.121 The notice stated “renovation” as the reason for eviction. 
However, a representative of the American Hotel later told The Globe and Mail that the owner’s 
true intention was to demolish the building and create market housing instead, making the issued 
eviction orders illegal.122 It was later revealed that the landlord did not get any of the necessary 
permits to carry out the renovations. Despite the nation-wide attention this case received, the 
City did not address the issue, resulting in the residents’ eviction and displacement. PIVOT 
noted, “the City has failed to take any enforcement action against the owner of the American 
Hotel for his publicly stated intent to convert the American Hotel to market housing outside the 
provisions of the Single Room Accommodation By-law.”123 The City’s indifferent attitude 
towards the American Hotel evictions demonstrated the City’s poor enforcement of the SRA, 
prompting landlords to continually breach the SRA without having to face repercussions.  
3.6.4 Project Civil City 
 
Of the two publications published by PIVOT, only the “Submissions of PIVOT Legal 
Society to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights” mentioned the PCC. The 
PCC was seen as a tool to modify “the behaviour of identifiable populations to ensure their 
behaviour conforms closely to the behaviour desired by businesses in the area.”124 In saying this, 
PIVOT echoed the findings made by the IOCC regarding the ways policing tactics were being 
used to prevent certain groups of people from exhibiting undesirable behaviour in public, but 
went one step further in their critique arguing the “criminalization of necessary behaviours 
perpetuates homelessness”125 because it prevented homeless people from accessing essential 
social services, never mind the fact that they could not afford to pay the fines. As a result, the 
PCC intensified poverty and homelessness in the DTES by further marginalizing the homeless.   
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3.6.5 Assistance to Shelter Act 
 
Of all the documents reviewed in this chapter, none of the publications released by the 
IOCC, CCAP, and PIVOT mentioned the ASA. However, the ASA was prominently mentioned 
in various newspaper sources. Media releases from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC), and articles from The Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, and Vancouver Province were 
used to write this chapter. The major voices who provided critique against the ASA were PIVOT 
and CCAP. The IOCC did not comment on the ASA. Considering the IOCC’s interest in civil 
liberty violations, it is strange the advocacy group remained silent on this issue. Regarding the 
media used in this chapter, the CBC was used for analysis because it was a prominent news 
source for many Canadians, rural and urban, and it frequently documented events related to the 
Olympic Games. The Globe and Mail was selected because it was another popular news source 
for many Canadians, and it was Canada’s largest national circulating newspaper. Lastly, the 
Vancouver Sun and the Vancouver Province were also selected because they were Vancouver’s 
two most read local newspapers. The timeframe for analysis spanned from January 2003 to 
December 2010. This timeframe was chosen because 2003 was the year that Vancouver won the 
Olympic bid, and 2010 was the year the Olympic Games were hosted. An online keyword search 
was conducted in all four media platforms. Any article that included keywords “assistance to 
shelter” was used in this section’s analysis.  
The CCAP and PIVOT collectively agreed that the ASA was put in place to clear the 
streets of homeless people in preparation for the Games. David Eby of PIVOT noted, “It will be 
a great way to get the homeless off the streets, and get them out of the view of visitors for the 
Olympic Games.”126 Similar to the PCC, critics noted that the ASA was put in place for “esthetic 
and cosmetic reasons”127 and was seen as “a ploy to beautify the Downtown Eastside for the 
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2010 Winter Games.”128 Comments such as, “it was an attempt to sweep the homeless from 
Vancouver streets,”129 “this is a cynical strategy by the Liberal government to force poor people 
off the streets for the Olympics,”130 “the act would be used to round up street people in 
Vancouver’s downtown during the Feb. 12-28 Winter Olympics,”131 and “it’s being used to 
displace people from particular streets for the Olympics”132 reflect the shared understanding that 
the ASA was used as a tool to remove the homeless from the streets in the preparation for the 
Games.  
Not surprisingly, the City was criticized for having ulterior motives because the by-law 
was enacted in 2009. David Eby of PIVOT noted, “The timing is very suspicious – homeless 
people have been dying for years. People could use this to move people out of residential areas, 
out of tourist areas.”133 Furthermore, critics challenged the vague definition of “extreme 
weather” in the ASA. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the term “extreme weather” in the ASA was 
not defined. Eby said, “You want to talk about how extreme weather will be defined? Well, 
typically its defined as three to five days of rain in a row. Well, that’s February in Vancouver.”134 
The vague definition of “extreme weather” allowed police to interpret the definition at their own 
discretion and to bring the homeless into shelter.  
The ASA was also criticized because the City did not have adequate resources to 
accommodate the homeless if the homeless were required to enter shelter. Laura Track of PIVOT 
noted, “The law doesn’t make sense because there aren’t enough shelter spaces.”135 Furthermore, 
the ASA would have negative impacts because the law would “drive many homeless people into 
hiding” for fear of losing their belongings or police harassment.136 As a result, critics argued that 
the ASA was not actually an initiative to help the homeless out of cold conditions, but an 
initiative to beautify the city in preparation for the Olympic Games.  
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3.7 Analysis 
 
 This chapter explored the publications of three advocacy groups regarding the issue of 
homelessness and public policy in the lead-up to the Olympic Games. Although all three groups 
advocated for housing issues, each group emphasized and advocated for policy-related issues 
differently. The first group explored in this chapter was the IOCC, whose main purpose was to 
monitor VANOC’s progress towards attaining the commitments in the ICI. The IOCC’s three 
most important publications, the Olympic Interim Report Cards, along with the Housing Table 
report, displayed how various housing by-laws exacerbated homelessness in the lead-up to the 
Games. The Housing Table report also illustrated the difficulty in establishing agreement 
between private and public sectors regarding housing policy recommendations as both sectors 
had different ideas and investments at stake. Instead of criticizing long-standing loopholes in 
housing policy, the IOCC recognized that loopholes in housing policy were inevitable and made 
recommendations to assist tenants in case they were illegally displaced. This type of advocacy 
differed from the CCAP and PIVOT, illustrating that public policy recommendation and 
amendments could be completed in various ways. However, due to changes in membership and 
politics within the group, the IOCC’s concern for housing policy was short-lived. Analyzing the 
Olympic Interim report cards, the IOCC focused mainly on the violations that affected its 
member, and less on housing issues that affected the DTES. Also, in the report cards, the IOCC 
paid more attention to the facts and statistics concerning homelessness than the loopholes in 
public policy. Ultimately, the IOCC’s label as the “official watchdog group” helped to promote 
the 2010 Olympics as the “Sustainable Games,” without Vancouver actually achieving any of its 
social sustainability goals for housing. The history of IOCC also sheds light on the complicated 
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nature of managing an advocacy coalition in an environment where public-private interests are 
blurred.  
 The second Olympic critic explored in this chapter was the CCAP. A long time social 
advocate for housing issues in the DTES, CCAP’s research provided valuable insight on the low-
income housing market, particularly SROs, in the lead-up to the Olympic Games. CCAP’s 
housing reports focused primarily on the status of SROs and provided the least information on 
housing and homelessness policies. However, CCAP’s reports have merit. Its research on soft 
conversions illustrated that property owners increased rent and imposed rent restrictions on 
citizens in order to profit from rising property values brought about by the Games.  
The third Olympic critic analyzed in this chapter was PIVOT. Of the three critics, 
PIVOT’s publications provided the most comprehensive coverage of housing and homelessness 
policies in Vancouver. PIVOT’s reports explored the implications and real life experiences that 
housing and civil liberty violations had on DTES citizens. PIVOT’s report, “Cracks in the 
Foundation,” illustrated the life experiences of numerous SRO tenants as a result of loopholes in 
various housing policies. And, “Submissions” was the only report that illustrated how the 
exploitation of public ordinances led to the violation of human rights in the lead-up to the 
Olympic Games.  
There were two common themes expressed by the IOCC, CCAP, and PIVOT regarding 
the SoM. First, all three groups noted that the SoM was put in place so that the City could 
intervene and make repairs if buildings were unliveable. However, the City repeatedly declined 
to initiate repairs and bill landlords for the costs. PIVOT noted that in spite of increasing 
knowledge and awareness of a housing crisis in Vancouver, by-law enforcement was declining. 
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The City’s lack of enforcement allowed property owners to leave SRO buildings uninhabitable. 
Second, SRO closures initiated by the City were exploited by property owners who wanted to 
convert their property without paying the SRA conversion fees. However, closures also limited 
the amount of housing stock available for low-income renters. All three groups argued that SRO 
closures were avoidable if the City conducted inspections and enforced the SoM on a regular 
basis. This suggests that homelessness was caused by the City’s failure to enforce the by-law. 
Although the SoM was created as a preventative measure against SRO closures, the by-law had 
no power to protect tenants because it was not being properly enforced.    
Longstanding flaws in the RTA provided landlords with ample opportunity to displace 
their tenants. One of the primary methods property owners used to displace their tenants was 
through eviction by renovation, otherwise known as “renovictions”.  Renovictions were illegal 
evictions issued by landlords to convert their property into more profitable housing. PIVOT 
found that many tenants experienced homelessness as a result of renovictions. Substantial rent 
increases also contributed to homelessness because many low-income citizens could not afford to 
pay market housing rates. Furthermore, tenants living in provincially-owned SRO units were 
displaced because they were not protected by the RTA. The RTA’s arbitration system also 
contributed to homelessness because it was a process that disadvantaged low-income renters. In 
many cases, tenants could not afford to follow through with arbitration because of the costs, or 
because of the convoluted process. To make matters worse, tenants who entered arbitration were 
at risk of losing their housing unit because landlords would find ways to evict tenants who 
complained about their management. And, there were no opportunities to appeal a court’s 
decision in favour of the landlord, even if the decision was considered unfair. Lastly, Vancouver 
did not establish sufficient services to prevent or protect people from displacement.  The 
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Residential Tenancy Branch provided little to no protection to tenants because it was not 
accessible or available for many tenants who experienced tenancy violations. As such, there were 
little to no services to assist tenants on the verge of becoming homeless.  
Similar to the RTA, the SRA displaced tenants in various ways. Thus, the IOCC, CCAP, 
and PIVOT each took issue with different aspects of the SRA. The rapid decline of available 
SRO stock prompted the IOCC to press for the production of replacement housing and stricter 
conversion fees. In contrast, the CCAP revealed that “soft conversions” were contributing to 
homelessness because low-income tenants were restricted from renting SRO units. The 
increasing number of soft converted SROs in the lead-up to the Games and the decline of soft 
converted SROs following the Games spoke to the profit motive of SRO owners. Lastly, PIVOT 
revealed that the City’s reluctance to enforce the SRA permitted landlords to exploit the SRA 
without having to face legal consequences: the American Hotel was a good illustration of this 
point.  
Of all the policies examined for this thesis, Olympic watchdog groups did not view the 
PCC to be the most pressing social issue in association with the Olympic Games. Instead, it was 
political opponents who criticized the PCC. The PCC was designed to prevent specific 
populations, notably the homeless, from exhibiting undesirable behaviours in public. The PCC 
was enforced through ticketing and fines, thus limiting the presence marginalized people in 
public. As such, the PCC was criticized as a beautification measure for city re-imaging purposes 
and as an infringement of human rights. 
 Similar to the PCC, the ASA was criticized as a beautification tool used to clear the 
homeless off the streets for city-reimaging purposes. Rather than a measure to assist citizens in 
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need, the vaguely defined provisions of the ASA, in addition to its timely enactment, supported 
the argument that it was little more than a tool to enhance the city’s image.    
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Chapter 4 
4 Summary, Conclusions, and Areas of Further Research 
4.1 Summary 
 
 The Olympic Games are regarded as one of the greatest sporting spectacles of all time. 
They are celebrated as an event unifying different countries through athletic competition. 
Although the Games are seen as a beacon of unity, host cities have a history of exacerbating the 
circumstances of marginalized communities, particularly the homeless. Over the past three 
decades, there has been a notable increase in evictions, gentrification, and criminalization of 
poverty associated with the Olympic Games. Many low-income tenants experience displacement 
and homelessness in the lead-up to the Games because low-income housing is often converted 
into market-value housing to meet rising property values. Olympic host cities have also seen an 
increase in ticketing, fines, and red-zoning of homeless populations. In 2003, when Vancouver 
won the rights to host the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, housing advocates and academics began 
to prepare for the potentially negative effects the Olympic Games could have on the Downtown 
Eastside (DTES), otherwise known as “Canada’s poorest neighbourhood.”  
This thesis examined how the 2010 Olympic Games contributed to homelessness in 
Vancouver by: 1) investigating how different social actors attempted to use local and provincial 
ordinances, such as the Standards of Maintenance By-law (SoM), the Residential Tenancy Act 
(RTA), the Single Room Accommodation By-law (SRA), the Project Civil City (PCC), and the 
Assistance to Shelter Act (ASA) to capitalize on the lucrative potential of the Olympic Games, 
and how their actions contributed to homelessness, and 2) documenting and analyzing the 
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arguments put forward by key advocacy groups that contested what was happening to low-
income and homeless residents because of Olympic related development. The Impact of the 
Olympics on Community Coalition (IOCC), the Carnegie Community Action Plan (CCAP), and 
PIVOT Legal Society (PIVOT) were the most prominent critics who spoke out against the 
policies.  
The findings from this thesis reveal three things. First, this thesis showed how SRO 
landlords and owners were motivated by the lucrative potential of the Games to exploit and 
profit from public housing policies that were poorly enforced by the City, resulting in mass 
displacement in the DTES, a population already characterized by marginalization and poverty. 
Second, it revealed how loopholes in public policies exacerbated homeless by providing 
landlords and owners with multiple ways to evict their tenants without legal repercussion. Third, 
this thesis described how Vancouver’s poorly designed housing policy system, coupled with the 
City’s longstanding refusal to enforce or amend housing by-laws, contributed to homelessness 
because landlords and owners were able to circumvent the regulations. Fourth, this thesis 
demonstrated how beautification measures are essential to the creation of a successful Olympic 
host city. However, this impression is often based on what a “prosperous” city looks like; that is, 
a city that has somehow, magically, eradicated poverty. To achieve this image cities attempt to 
control and marginalize certain groups of people from exhibiting behaviours that will somehow 
diminish this image. Altogether, these factors contributed to a housing crisis in Vancouver’s 
DTES before the Olympic Games, an area that was already recognized as one of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in Canada. 
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4.1.1 Findings on Advocacy Groups 
 
The first group examined in this thesis was the IOCC. Known for their role as an 
Olympic watchdog group, their most significant contribution was their assessment of VANOC’s 
commitment to social sustainability issues through three Olympic Interim Report Cards and the 
Housing Table Report. These reports revealed that the IOCC’s commitment towards social 
sustainability shifted considerably throughout its career, due in part to a change in membership 
and politics within the group. Initially, the Housing Table Report committed the IOCC to helping 
VANOC and government partners alleviate homelessness in the lead-up to the Games. However, 
analyzing the report cards, it was evident that housing issues became less of a priority as the 
years wore on. With each subsequent report card, the IOCC became more concerned about civil 
liberty violations, likely because it was more pertinent to the group itself, and less concerned 
about other commitments outlined in the Inner-City Inclusivity Statement (ICI). However, the 
Housing Table Report is valuable because it reveals some of the concerns the IOCC once had 
about various housing by-laws in the lead-up to the Games. Instead of critiquing the loopholes of 
various policies, the IOCC put forward suggestions to benefit low-income tenants if they were 
illegally displaced. The IOCC’s progressive approach to housing policy differentiated the IOCC 
from CCAP and PIVOT because the IOCC created policy recommendations to benefit tenants in 
the midst of illegal housing activity instead of trying to correcting loopholes, which would 
always exist. The Housing Table also revealed the difficulty of establishing policy 
recommendations because both public and private sectors had different ideas about the housing 
situation in Vancouver.  
 The CCAP was a social advocacy group that fought for housing and low-income issues in 
the DTES. This thesis examined three housing survey reports published by the CCAP (2008, 
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2009, 2010). The reports revealed that the 2010 Olympic Games had a dramatic impact on 
Vancouver’s low-income housing market because many landlords and owners took advantage of 
rising property values associated with the coming Games. In particular, CCAP’s findings on 
“soft conversions” revealed that landlords made their living units inaccessible to low-income 
tenants by increasing the rent and renting to tourists only. As a result, “soft conversions” limited 
the number of single-room occupancy (SRO) units available for low-income tenants in the lead-
up to the Games. Although CCAP’s research summarized the SRO situation in the DTES, their 
results provided the least insight and analysis on Vancouver’s housing policies.  
The third group analyzed in this thesis was PIVOT, which was a legal firm that advocated 
for low-income housing issues affecting DTES citizens, as well as issues relating to police 
harassment, tenancy breaches, and sex trafficking. PIVOT’s research illustrated the bleak 
experiences of tenants living in Vancouver’s SROs and the unconstitutional nature of the PCC 
and the ASA as they were applied to the homeless. Of the three groups, PIVOT was the only 
group to speak out against the unconstitutional nature of various Olympic-related policies on 
homeless populations.  
4.1.2 Findings on Policies 
 
In the lead-up to the 2010 Olympic Games, homelessness was exacerbated by policy 
loopholes for two reasons. First, the City’s failure to enforce municipal and provincial housing 
by-laws, such as the SoM, RTA, and SRA, aggravated the state of homelessness in Vancouver. 
Not only were tenants displaced from their homes, but the number of SRO units available to low-
income tenants rapidly declined in the lead-up to the Games. Second, homelessness policies such 
as the PCC and ASA were harmful because they controlled the presence and behaviour of the 
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homeless for beautification and re-imaging purposes. Control tactics included red-zoning 
(preventing) homeless people from accessing certain public spaces and ticketing poverty 
practices. These tactics were criticized for selectively targeting the homeless and coercively 
limiting them from choosing where they could stay.  
Created in 1981, the SoM was put in place to protect SROs from deterioration. Landlords 
were required by law to address all health and safety hazards in SROs. In the event that landlords 
did not conduct the repairs, the City could conduct the repairs and bill the landlord afterwards. If 
a building remained hazardous to the tenants, the City was permitted to close the SRO. The 
IOCC, CCAP, and PIVOT recognized that the SoM was not regularly enforced by the City. 
Instead, the City’s efforts to enforce the SoM had declined substantially in the lead up to the 
Games despite the degenerating conditions of Vancouver’s SROs. Instead of conducting repairs, 
the City usually opted to close the buildings, thereby decreasing the amount of SRO stock 
available to low-income tenants. Since Vancouver’s housing policies were failing to protect low-
income tenants prior to the Games, it was inevitable that many tenants would be abused by 
landlords looking to profit from rising property values.  
 Although the RTA was revised in 2002, tenants experienced Olympic-related 
displacement in a number of different ways because the City did not address pre-existing 
problems in the RTA. First, the RTA’s rent controls made new tenants susceptible to high rent 
increases because the rental rate applied to the tenant and not to the rental unit. Second, tenants 
who lived in provincially-owned or non-profit buildings were more susceptible to losing their 
living unit because they were not protected under the provisions of the RTA. Third, the RTA’s 
arbitration process often discouraged tenants from asserting their tenancy rights because it was 
financially-challenging and confusing. Landlords also used the arbitration process as an 
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intimidation tactic to prevent tenants from considering an appeal, which further highlighted 
power imbalances between the landlord and the tenant. Lastly, the Residential Tenancy Branch 
was often inaccessible and unavailable to cater to tenants whose tenancies were breached. 
Altogether, these factors exacerbated homelessness because tenants had little power to exercise 
their rights against landlords and owners who ignored the RTA.  
 In 2003, the City created the SRA to prevent the premature conversion and demolition of 
SRO housing stock in the DTES. All three advocacy groups had a different perspective on the 
SRA. The IOCC acknowledged that a loss in housing stock due to conversion and demolition 
was inevitable. As a result, public sector representatives of the Housing Table, including the 
IOCC, argued for the implementation of stricter conversion measures, greater administration 
fees, and increased funding for replacement housing to compensate for housing loss. However, 
private sector representatives of the Table disagreed with these measures because it interfered 
with the way private owners profited from their property.  CCAP’s research focused on “soft 
conversions.” By measuring the numbers of soft conversions in the years leading up to the 
Games, CCAP’s research indicated that landlords were motivated to profit from the rising market 
values stemming from the Games. Meanwhile, PIVOT focused on the City’s failure to enforce 
the SRA, demonstrated by the City’s inaction to address the American Hotel’s conversion. 
 In 2007, Vancouver mayor Sam Sullivan created a public disorder initiative aimed at 
decreasing public nuisance and homelessness through increased policing and control tactics. 
Contrary to the criticism expressed by politicians, the PCC was seldom mentioned by the critics 
examined in this thesis, suggesting that most of the criticism resulted mainly from opposing 
politicians unhappy with the project. However, the IOCC and PIVOT both noted that the PCC 
was harmful to marginalized citizens because it prevented homeless people from accessing 
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certain spaces and aggressively targeted the marginalized through ticketing. The IOCC argued 
the intent behind the PCC was to remove the homeless from areas visible to Olympic visitors so 
as to provide a “clean” image of a prosperous city. Ticketing also contributed to city- reimaging 
as it controlled the visibility of poverty practices, such as sleeping in public spaces and loitering. 
Similar to other host cities, the PCC reveals that beautification measures are frequently used for 
the Olympic Games. However, police-based policy initiatives have a long history of negative 
impacts on marginalized communities. As such, the PCC was not created to protect inner-city 
citizens; rather it was a disabling measure, intended to control the ‘undesirable’ elements of 
poverty from corrupting Vancouver’s world-class image for the Games.  
 Similarly, the ASA was seen as a beautification tool used to clear the homeless off the 
streets. Created in 2009, the ASA allowed the police to use force to bring the homeless into 
shelters during extreme weather. The timing of the ASA was suspicious because it was put into 
place a year prior to the Games, despite there being a long history of deaths among the homeless 
caused by cold temperatures. Vaguely defined terms such as “reasonable force” and “extreme 
weather” were criticized as giving officers the power to coercively place the homeless into 
shelters at their own discretion. Housing advocates argued that the ASA was unconstitutional 
because it took away the right of the homeless to choose where to stay. The ASA reveals that 
city beautification measures selectively target the homeless, and thus violate their rights to 
choose to stay on the street.  
 In all, this thesis illustrates there needs to be greater consideration for the policy needs of 
low-income and homeless citizens in host cities. Also, host cities need to do a much better job of 
protecting the interests of low-income tenants and their right to sustainable and healthy housing. 
For Vancouver, low-income housing loss and tenant displacement could have been prevented if 
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the City had regularly enforced the SoM, SRA, and RTA. Public officials must also acknowledge 
that low-income and homeless communities are valued members of society, and one way to do 
that is to protect their right to safe and affordable housing, as well as their right to choose where 
they want to stay. Instead of moving the homeless into shelters and ticketing poverty practices, 
public officials should place greater emphasis and funding on helping the homeless to find 
housing and social services. Police-based tactics such as the PCC and ASA violate the rights of 
the homeless, as well as perpetuate the stereotypes of undesirability associated with 
homelessness.  
4.2 Conclusions 
 
This thesis reveals that Olympic-related displacement and homelessness is a multi-
faceted problem that requires the cooperation of public officials, advocacy groups, researchers, 
and the public. Public officials must be held accountable to their promises of  “social 
sustainability” and the reality that public policies play a crucial role in achieving that goal. Not 
only that, considering the long history of Olympic-related homelessness, Olympic organizing 
committees should begin to assume responsibility for and prevent human rights violations which 
occurs as a result of the Games. Everybody, including the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) and the Olympic organizing committees, has the responsibility to uphold social 
sustainability and discourage human rights violations. As a result, social sustainability should not 
only begin and end with public policymakers. Instead, the IOC and Olympic organizing 
committees should take steps to ensure that social sustainability commitments are attained in 
each future host city. An example of this would be to install a committee member solely 
responsible for Olympic-related social sustainability in host cities or to rewrite the Olympic 
Charter to include social sustainability in the IOC’s mandate.  
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This thesis also shows that advocacy groups need to align their human and financial 
resources so that they can more effectively address important social issues like housing and 
homelessness for a major games. Public policy officers and Olympic organizing committees 
need to consider how taxpayers’ dollars and government funds can be used to enhance the social 
circumstances of underserviced in the lead up to the Games. Researchers can assist these goals 
by documenting and analyzing what public officials say and what they do in terms of legacy 
development. Scholars need to consider the local politics of the host city and the people who 
contribute to the Games on a municipal level. Although homelessness affects every city on a 
global scale, the needs of every homeless community are specific to the socio-economic, 
cultural, and political aspects of a city. Large-scale theoretical models are often only a band-aid 
solution for deeply-rooted issues like homelessness. Scholars should consider placing greater 
emphasis on consulting with local politicians and advocacy groups to better understand how 
issues related to homelessness and mega-events are being perceived. In this way, scholars can 
apply theoretical models to complement the dynamics of the city. This thesis also shows how the 
public can play a key role in sport legacies: their voice matters in terms of holding public 
officials accountable to their promises. The public needs to be educated as to what promises are 
made, how elected public officials are fulfilling their roles to protect the public good, and 
whether or not their stated promises were achieved. In the end, this thesis shows that mega-event 
hosting in and of itself does not cause homelessness. Rather, homelessness is caused by a lack of 
oversight and accountability on the part of public officials – and the public – who, together as 
partners, must ensure a better future for the people most vulnerable when the Olympic Games 
roll into town. 
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4.3 Areas of Further Research 
 
 There are many aspects of homelessness, public policy, and the 2010 Olympic Games 
that were not addressed in this thesis. This section suggests three different areas of future 
research that scholars can pursue to get a better understanding of the topic. First, this thesis 
examined a very limited number of resources pertaining to Vancouver’s housing issues. Looking 
at a greater variety of sources can provide a greater understanding of the homelessness crisis in 
Vancouver. For example, an examination of local and nationally-circulated newspapers or social 
media publications can reveal popular perceptions of homelessness in relation to public policy 
and the Games. Scholars should also look at correspondences between the advocacy groups, 
VANOC, government partners, and voices from the community to get a better understanding of 
what each advocacy groups thought of public policy in relation to homelessness in the Games.  
 Second, this thesis was limited in the way that only the major publications of each group 
were consulted. An area of further research is to interview members of housing advocacy groups 
and also VANOC to get a better idea of what could have been done regarding the housing 
situation in Vancouver. Interviews can reveal what was not written in paper regarding the 
politics of each group and the relations shared between each group.  Interviews with SRO owners 
should also be conducted to see whether land owners were actually motivated to profit from the 
Games and to identify other factors that contributed to tenant displacement. Lastly, interviews 
with SRO tenants can reveal the living situation of SROs and also explain the ways displacement 
affects tenants in the lead-up to the Olympic Games.  
 Third, an area of future research is to examine the legacy of the housing situation in 
Vancouver and assess the social impacts of the Games on Vancouver’s housing market. In this 
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way, scholars can better understand the impact of the Olympic Games upon the low-income 
housing market in Vancouver. This type of study can also reveal whether commitments to 
improve Vancouver’s low-income housing market and homelessness situation actually 
materialized or whether it was only rhetoric to convince citizens to invest in bringing a mega-
event to a city.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
Term Short 
Form 
Significance 
Assistance to Shelter 
Act 
ASA - Created in 2009, the ASA allowed police to transport homeless 
individuals by use of coercion to shelter in severely cold 
temperatures. 
Carnegie 
Community Action 
Project 
CCAP - First formed in 1996 as a research and advocacy organization, the 
CCAP’s goal was to track the effects of poverty and the lack of low-
income housing in Vancouver. 
Downtown Eastside DTES - Known as one of Canada’s poorest neighbourhoods, activists were 
concerned that the Games would exacerbate the social ills of the 
neighbourhood, particularly homelessness, in the lead up to the 
Games. 
Impact of the 
Olympics on 
Community 
Coalition 
IOCC - Created in 2002, the IOCC was comprised primarily of various 
community activists and academics. They were the main watchdog 
group for the Vancouver Games, but eventually disbanded due to 
internal differences. 
Inner-city Inclusive 
Commitment 
Statement 
ICI - Created in 2002, the ICI was comprised of 14 promises to make the 
Vancouver Games the most socially sustainable Games in history. 
Unfortunately, many of the commitments did not come to fruition. 
PIVOT Legal Society PIVOT - Created in 2000, PIVOT was a legal firm that fought against poverty 
and social injustices in the DTES. PIVOT provided important analyses 
on Vancouver’s public policies and the Games. 
Project Civil City PCC - Created in 2006, the PCC was created to reduce public disorder, 
specifically homelessness and public nuisance, in preparation for the 
Games. 
Residential Tenancy 
Act 
RTA -  Revised in 2002, the RTA outlined the regulations of a lawful 
tenancy agreement between the tenant and landlord. However, it 
often highlighted the power imbalance between the two parties, 
leading to unlawful evictions. 
Single Room 
Accommodation By-
law 
SRA - Created in 2003, the SRA regulated the conversion and demolition 
of single room accommodation in the DTES. However, it could not 
prevent landlords from leaving buildings to deteriorate permitting 
the issuance of demolition permits. 
Single Room 
Occupancy hotels 
SRO - SRO hotels were the last stop before homelessness. Yet, these 
units were most vulnerable to deterioration and conversion in the 
lead-up to the Games. 
Standards of 
Maintenance  
By-law 
SoM - Created in 1981, the SoM ensured that residential buildings were 
in conformity to health, fire, and building regulations. However, 
poor accountability between the City and landlords encouraged 
landlords to leave property unattended. 
Vancouver Olympic VANOC - VANOC was the organizing committee for the Vancouver Games. 
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Organizing 
Committee 
Unfortunately, many of the social sustainability commitments that 
they created did not come to fruition. 
Vancouver Police 
Department 
VPD - Increased policing in Vancouver was an integral part to ensuring 
the eradication of public nuisance and homelessness. However, 
police-based policy initiatives have had a long history of negative 
impacts on the DTES’ homeless population. 
Appendix 1: A glossary of all the terms used in the thesis 
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